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ISSUE TWO

Whose Crime is it Anyway?: Liability for
the Lethal Acts of Nonparticipants in
the Felony

Picture an old James Cagney movie, where three swaggering robbers enter a bank, point a gun at the young cashier, and demand her
money or her life. A getaway car waits outside with the motor running. The cashier hands over a bag of money and begins to scream.
The robbers grab the bag and run outside, where all bedlam breaks
loose. The police arrive on the scene, a gun battle ensues, and bystanders run for cover. When the dust settles, an innocent bystander
lies dead, killed by a bullet from a policeman's gun during the
shootout.
Now, picture a drug deal that goes sour in an unlit stairway in a
rundown apartment building.' The intended victim, an undercover
police officer, seizes the weapon and a struggle develop^.^ The injured officer draws his revolver and begins shooting, a bullet hits his
leg.3 The backup team arrives and a fusillade of gunfire ensue^.^ The
grim result is realized in the aftermath of the shooting-one of the
police officers is dead from a single shot to the head.5 The bullet is
not recovered, and it is not known who fired the fatal shot.6
Both of these scenarios involve a similar issue: Who, if anyone,
should be liable for the death of these two nonparticipants in the

* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1977, The University at Albany; J.D. 1981, Syracuse University.
I wish to express my appreciation for the research assistance of Maria R Ashley
and Susanne Kantor.
1. People v. Hernandez, 588 N.Y.S.2d 567-68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), affd, 624
N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1993).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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crime? The felony-murder doctrine, which originated in England,
generally provides that when a death occurs during the perpetration
of a felony, the defendant is liable for homicide, even if defendant
lacked the intent to
Because of the harsh results imposed by the
doctrine, it has received a substantial body of criticism, including being called a " 'barbaric' concept that . . . erodes the relation between
criminal liability and moral culpability . . . ."* Despite these criticisms,
this theory of liability has survived for over 200 years? However, the
felony-murder doctrine has been subjected to many different modiications, that vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.1°
The most problematic issue surrounding the felony-murder doctrine is how far to extend the doctrine in imposing murder liability on
a defendant who did not perform the act of killing when the act results in the death of a nonparticipant. Because the felony-murder
doctrine does not require any intent, legislatures and courts have relied on the element of causation to either extend or restrict liability in
that factual situation." This approach has led to inconsistent and
confusing results, stemming from imprecise draftsmanship, inaccurate
understanding of the theories of causation, and differing policy
reasons.
This Article explores the methodology that courts should employ
when determining the liability of a defendant under the felony-murder doctrine, where the perpetration of a felony results in the death of
- a nonparticipant in the crime by another nonparticipant. Part I of the
Article addresses the history of the doctrine, the policies that have
sustained it throughout history, and the modern statutory promulgations of the rule. Part I1 explores not only how courts have handled
the doctrine's causation requirement, but also how legislatures have
responded to this requirement. Further, Part I1 discusses the courtcreated theories of agency and proximate cause.
Part I11 addresses the need for a consistent analytical framework
and demonstrates the current confusion that has resulted fiom courts
construing a statute to require different causation approaches. Part
I11 submits that the courts' reliance on the agency theory, which requires an initial determination that a felon shot the fatal bullet, is inconsistent with both society's view towards crime and principles of
statutory analysis. By applying the agency theory, the courts are using
7. RONALD
A. ANDERSON,
1 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE
539
(1957).
8. People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 709 (Cal. 1983) (citations omitted).
9. For a discussion of the felony-murder doctrine's historical development and
ultimate survival, see sources cited inpa notes 1434 and accompanying text
10. For a discussion of the numerous statutory modifications to the doctrine, see
sources cited inpa notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the causation element of the doctrine, see sources cited
inpa notes 72-150 and accompanying text.

Heinonline - - 71 U. Det. Mercy

224 1993-1994

19941

WHOSE CRLME IS IT ANYWAY?

225

causation to restrict the application of the felony-murder doctrine, a
responsibility that should be left to the legislature.
Part IV proposes a methodology that is consistent with both principles of statutory interpretation and society's view toward crime. This
approach uses the ordinary rules of causation and modifies them to
apply to felony-murder. As an example, the proposed methodology is
applied to various factual scenarios where the person who does the
killing is unknown, or is someone other than the defendant, and the
victim is a nonparticipant in the felony. Under this analysis, courts
can not only interpret the causation requirement of the felony-murder doctrine consistently, but can also ensure the uniform administration of justice.

The felony-murder doctrine, although much maligned, is still a
frequently used theory of liability. Its continued viability reflects the
societaljudgment that a felony resulting in a death, even if that death
rvas not intended, should be punished more severely than a felony not
resulting in a death.'* The felony-murder doctrine should continue
to exist if the above conclusion accurately represents society's judgment, and further, if the development of crimes should indeed depict
societaljudgrnent.13 Thus, it is necessary to examine the history and
policies behind the felony-murder rule, as well as the numerous statutory promulgations of the rule, to determine whether the doctrine has
continued viability.

A.

The Histmy of the Doctrine

All homicides were considered to be criminal at early common
law.'* The mental state of the actor was deemed irrelevant.15 All
12. David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In D 4 m e ofthe Felony M u r h Doctrine, 8

k v . J.L. & PUB.POL'Y359, 363 (1985).
13. Id. The aim of criminal law is to prevent harm to society. It accomplishes
that aim by punishing those who have done harm. Thus, it follows that criminal law
must reflect those areas that society feels are deserving of punishment. See gaeraUy
Joseph R Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process ofDesignatingDeviance, 56
CAL. L. REV. 54, 5&59 (1968).
14. People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 903-04 (Cal. 1984) (Bird, C.J., concurTHELAWOF HOMICIDE
1-4 (1952); Paul H. Robinson, A
ring) (citing ROYMORELAND,
Brief Histoy of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 H A s l l ~ ~
L.J.s 815, 823 (1980);
Francis Bowes Sayre, Mem Rea, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 974, 977-81 (1932)).
15. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing ROYMORELAND,
THELAWOF HOMICIDE
1-4
(1952); Paul H. Robinson, A Brief Histoy of Distindionr in Criminal Culpability, 31 ]HAS
n N G s L.J. 815,823 (1980); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mem Rea, 45 W v . L. REV. 974,97781 (1932)).
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homicides were punishable by death.16 By the thirteenth century,
"the law . . . recognized the need to distinguish between intentional
and . . . [unintentional] killings."" Although an accidental killing
would not entitle a defendant to an acquittal, he could be granted a
royal pardon.''
The Church had a strong influence on the development of the
law of homicide. Because the Church refused to impose capital punishment, submitting a case to the jurisdiction of the Church meant
that instead of death the defendant was only subjected to the branding of his thumb and imprisonment.lg Known as the "benefit of
clergy," this practice was expanded to cover all persons who were literate, under the premise that those persons were clerics and thus ineligible for the death
Thus, the law began to impose degrees
of punishment based on the accused's character rather than the nature of the offense.
As the injustice of this system became increasingly obvious, a series of statutes were promulgated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that abolished the "benefit of clergy" for homicides that were
committed with "malice aforethought" or "malice ~repensed."~'
These more culpable homicides were called "murders," while the less
culpable homicides for which "benefit of clergy" was still available became "mansla~ghter."~~
It was at about this time that the felony-murder doctrine came
into existence. Although the most frequently cited statement of the
rule appears in Lord Coke's Third Institute, commentators have concluded that Coke's creation of the rule is without any legal foundat i ~ n Coke's
. ~ ~ description of the rule was subsequently refined and
16. Id. at 904 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing ROLLINM. PERKINS
& RONALD
N.
CRIMINAL
LAW 14 (3d ed. 1982);Jeanne Hall Seibold, Note, The Felony M u r k
BOYCE,
Rule: In Search o f a Viable Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAW 133 n.1 (1978)).
17. Id. (Bird, C.J.,concurring).
18. Id. (Bird, C.J.,concurring) (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197
L.J. 537,539(1971); Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Afmhought, 43 YALE
40 (1934); Sayre, supra note 14, at 980).
19. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing Sayre, supra note 14, at 99&97).
20. Id. (Bird, C.J.,concurring) (citing Note, Felony M u r k as a First Degree Offme:
An Anachronism Retained, 66 YALEL.J. 427, 429 (1957)).
21. Id. (Bird, C.J.,concurring).
22. Id. at 904-05 (Bird, C.J.,concurring) (citing Perkins, szcpra note 18, at 543-

44).
23. Id. at 905 (Bird, C.J., concurring). In his treatise, Lord Coke illustrates the
rule but does not give any rationale for i t He states:
"If the act be unlawful it is murder. As if A. meaning to steal a deer in
the park of B., shooteth at the deer, and by the glance of the arrow killeth a
boy that is hidden in a bush: this is murder, for that the act was u n l a h l ,
although A. had no intent to hurt the boy, nor knew not of him. But if B.
the owner of the park had shot at his own deer, and without any ill intent
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limited to find murder when a killing is committed in the course of a
felony, regardless of the defendant's intent.24
The felony-murder rule was abolished by the English Parliament
in the Homicide Act of 1957.25The English statute now provides that
"a killing in the course of a felony is not murder unless the essential
element of malice is independently proved."26 However, because the
condition of English common law in 1776 served as the basis for the
development of American common law, Blackstone's version of the
felony-murder rule became an integral part of American jurisprud e n ~ e . ~Yet,
' for over two hundred years American courts and legislatures have dealt with the doctrine in myriad ways.
As early as 1794, the Pennsylvania Legislature broke away from
the English tradition by dividing murder into two degrees, with only
first degree murder punishable by death.28 The Ohio Legislature
had killed the boy by the glance of his arrow, this had been homicide by
misadventure, and no felony."
Id. (Bird, C.J., concumng) (quoting Lorn COKE,THIRD IN^ 56 (6th ed. 1680));
see also People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 309 & n.22 (Mich. 1980) (quoting Lorn
COKE,THIRDINSI~TUTES
56 (1797)). Although this statement went unquestioned for
over two hundred years, no one seems to know the basis for the statement. See Burroughs, 678 P.2d at 90506. While two sixteenth century cases have been suggested as
support, courts and critics have since concluded that these cases stood for a diierent
proposition. Id at 905. For a discussion of those cases, see i d at 906 n.9 (Bird, C.J.,
concumng) (quoting Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 307-08).
24. Burroughs, 678 P.2d at 905 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (stating that "the rule was
redefined by Hale and Foster, who limited the murder designation to any killing in
the course of a felony.") (citing 1 SIRM.4-v
EIALE, PLEASOF THE CROWN
465,475
CASES 25&59 (2d ed. 1791)).
(1847); SIRMICHAEL
FOSTER,CROWN
25. Id. at 907 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
26. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Bird notes the following with regard to the English Homicide Act of 1957:
Section 1 of the act provided in relevant part:
"Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some
other offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the
same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to
amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another
offence."
Id. (Chief Justice Bird quoting Sidney Prevezer, One English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder, 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 633-36 (1957)).
27. Id. at 908 (Bird, C.J., concurring). The rule is stated in Blackstone's as
follows:
w h e n an involuntary killing happens in consequence of an unlawful act, it
will be either murder or manslaughter according to the nature of the act
which occasioned it. If it be in prosecution of a felonious intent, or in it's
[sic] consequences naturally tended to bloodshed, it will be murder; but if no
more was intended than a mere civil trespass, it will only amount to
manslaughter.
Id. n.17 (Bird, C.J., concumng) (citing 4 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
192-93
(Tucker ed., 1803) (footnote omitted)).
28. Edwin R Keedy, Histmy of the Pennsylvania Statute CreatingDegrees of Murder, 97
U. PA. L. REV. 759,772-73 & n.99 (1949) (citing 4 J. OF SENATE
242 (Pa. 1794)).
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promulgated the statutory abolition of felony-murder in 1854.29 Further, Oliver Wendell Holmes questioned the Ohio rule's validity in
1881.30
Catapulted by the Model Penal Code, and Illinois and New York
Penal Law revisions, a huge upsurge of reform took place in the 1960s
and 1970s." In total, more than half of the states' penal codes were
revised during this period.32 ConsequentIy, the felony-murder rule
went through numerous legislative modifications. These legislative
modifications, coupled with court created interpretations, have led to
many d i e r e n t versions of the rule. Despite all of the criticisms of the
it currently remains in force in all but three jurisdiction^.^^

B. Policies Underlying the Doctrine
There have been various justifications for the felony murder doctrine over the years.s5 Under the theory of deterrence, proponents
argue that co-felons will not resort to violence while committing a fel29. Burroughs, 678 P.2d at 908 (Bird, C.J., concumng) (citing Robbins v. State, 8
Ohio St. 131, 188-90 (1857) (holding that intent is an essential ingredient of
murder)).
30. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing OLWER
WENDELL
HOLMES,
THECOMMON
LAW 57-58 (1881)).
& MARTINR GARDNER,
CRIMES
AND PUNISH~IENT:
CASES,
31. RICHARDG. SINGER
~ ~ T E R I A L S AND
,
READINGSIN CRIMINAL
LAW 388-91 (1989) (citing Model Penal Code
5 210.2); ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 9, para. 9-1 (Supp. 1993); N.Y. PENALLAW§ 125.25 (McKinney 1987). See generally Jo Anne C. Alderstein, Felony M u r k in the New Criminal
Codes, 4 AMJ. CRIM.L. 249 (1975-1976).
32. See, e.6, ARK.CODEANN. $5 41-1501 to 1505 (Michie Supp. 1993) (revision in
effect 1976); COLO.REV. STAT.§ 18-3102 (West 1993) (revision in effect 1972); CONN.
GEN.STAT. § 53a-54c (West 1993) (revision in effect 1971); DEL.CODEANN. tit. 11,
5 635-035 (1993) (revision in effect 1973); FLA. STAT.ANN. 5 782.04 (West 1993)
(revision in effect 1975); GA. CODEANN. 5 26-1101 (Michie 1993) (revision in effect
REV. STAT.5 701-04 (1993) (revision in effect 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT.ch.
1969); HAW.
38 para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (revision in effect 1962); KAN. STAT.ANN. 5 21-3401
(1993) (revision in effect 1970); KY. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 507.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1993) (revision in effect 1975); ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 17-A, 5 201-03 (West 1993)
(revision in effect 1976); MINN.STAT.ANN. 5 609.185-195 (West 1993) (revision in
effect 1963); MONT.CODEANN. 5 945-102 (1993) (revision in effect 1974). For others
statutes, see the attached Appendix.
33. For a discussion of criticisms of the felony-murder doctrine, see People v.
Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980).
34. The felony-murder statute was abolished by the legislature in Hawaii and
REV. STAT.5 707-710 (1976); KY. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 507.020 (Michie/
Kentucky. HAW.
Bobbs Memll 1975). It was held to be unconstitutional by the Michigan Supreme
Court in People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980). Other states, while not abolishing the felony-murder doctrine, have required some level of mens rea. See inza
note 54 and accompanying text.
35. See generally Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony- Murder Rule: A
Doctrine at Cmtitutional CmssroadF, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 446, 450-60 (1985).
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ony if they may be held liable for m ~ r d e r . 3The
~ doctrine has also
been viewed as a deterrent to dangerous fel~nies.~'The deterrence
rationale has been criticized widely as illogical and illegitimate. Those
opposing the rationale argue that an unintended act cannot be deterred.38 Another criticism is that few felons, if any, will know about
the felony-murder doctrine or believe that a killing will actually res ~ l Finally,
t ~ ~ the critics maintain that there is no evidence that a
disproportionate number of killings occur during felonies.40
The problem with such criticism is that it may be overly simplisAlthough it is likely that most felons cannot cite to the felonymurder statute, it is equally probable that the general population is at
least aware of the basic premise of the felony-murder doctrine. In
addition, the premise that accidental killings cannot be deterred is
inconsistent with the expanding amount of strict liability crimes,
which often rely on a deterrence rationale.42 There is no empirical
evidence to suggest that a felon would not be deterred from committing a violent crime, yet there is evidence to suggest that serious crime'

36. Id. at 450. The authors conclude that the deterrence rationale consists of two
strains: defendants are deterred from committing accidental or negligent killings
during felonies, and defendants are deterred from committing dangerous felonies.
Id. at 450-51; see also Robert Mauldin Elliot, Comment, The Merger Doctrine as a Limitation on the Felony Murder R u k A Balance of Criminal Law Principles, 13 WAKEFORESTL.
REV. 369, 374 (1977) ("[M]ostjurisdictions have characterized the purpose to be .
the deterrence of negligent or accidental killings during the perpetration of a felony."). But see Jonathan K. Van Patten, Comment, Merger and the Califmia Felony
Murder Rule, 20 UCLA L. REV. 250, 258-59 n.41 (1972) (finding it difficult to see how
an accidental homicide can be deterred).
37. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 139, (Cal. 1965) (Burke,J., dissenting) (the purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from undertaking inherently dangerous felonies); State v. Williams, 254 So. 2d 548, 550-51 (Ha. 1971)
(The felony-murder statute creates "a deterrent effect to the commission of [inherently dangerous] felonies by substituting the mere intent to commit those felonies for
the premeditated design to effect death . . .").
38. Van Patten, supra note 36, at 258-59 n.41.
39. See generally Philip D. Zeliko~v,Comment, The Constitutionality of Imposing the
Death Penalty for Felony Murder, 15 Hous. L. REV. 356, 376-79 (1978).
40. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,799-800 (1982) (finding, in its summation
of statistical data, that only one-half of one percent of all robberies result in
homicide).
41. See Crump & Crump, supra note 12, at 369-71 (concluding that deterrence is
a valid rationale).
42. One argument advanced in justif~cationof strict liability in public welfare
offenses is that the protection of societal interests requires a high standard of care
which people will be more likely to maintain if they know that lack of intent will not
excuse them. See generally Regina v. City of Sault Ste. Mark, 2 S.C.R. 1299 (Can. 1978);
Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Oficers for Strict Liability OffmesAnother Vim,35 VAND.L. REV. 1337 (1982); Deve@nmts in the LautCorporate Crime:
Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV.L. REV. 1227 (1979).

..

.
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is subject to deterrence if the consequences are communicated to the
potential defendant?3
Courts and commentators have also justified the doctrine on the
basis that the defendant committed a felony which resulted in a killing. Because the defendant has committed a heinous act, he deserves
to be severely punished. This retribution or condemnation theory of
punishment focuses on punishing the defendant based on the seriousness of the harm, rather than his intent.44 Again, although the justification of retribution has been severely criti~ized:~it continues to be
cited by the courts as a rationale for the d ~ c t r i n e ? ~
The felony-murder doctrine does communicate that a crime that
takes a human life is different from one that does not, and is thus
deserving of a more severe punishment?' Thus, through retribution
and condemnation, societal norms and values are reinforced; the
"bad person" is punished, and the conduct of good persons is rewarded. As one court stated, one goal of sentencing is "community
condemnation. . .or [the] reaffirmation of societal norms for the purpose of maintaining respect for the norms them~elves."~~
Fear of
crime continues to pervade our society.*' Some researchers have explained that this fear of crime is an indication of perceived social disorder.50 This social disorder can be restructured through retribution
and punishment.
Although critics have maligned the policies underlying the felony-murder doctrine, its continued viability suggests that those policies reflect a strong societal interest. A felony that results in a death
should be punished more severely than a felony that does not, even if
there was no intent to cause the death. Since the evolution of crimes
should indeed represent societal judgment, the felony-murder doctrine continues to thrive despite all the criticisms.

43. See Crump & Crump, supra note 12, at 369-371.
44. See State v. O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d 797, 798 (S.D. 1980); WAYNE
R WAVE
&
AUSTINW. SCOTT,CRIMINAL
LAW640 (2d ed. 1986); Comment, 24 RUTGERS
L. REV.
591, 59396 (1970).
45. Roth & Sundby, supra note 35, at 45859.
46. Id. at 460.
47. Crump & Crump, supra note 12, at 367-78.
48. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).
49. Gallup PoU: High Fear of Crime, CRIME
CONTROL
DIG.,Feb. 28, 1983, at 1, 8
(finding that "45 percent of Americans are afraid to go out alone at night within a
mile of their homesn).
50. Chris E. Marshall, Fear of Crime, Community Satisfation and SeIf-ProtectiveMeasures: Perceptiow From a Midwesta City, 14 J. CRIME
& JUSL 97,101 (1991).
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C. The Present Day Statute
Although there are some states where the felony-murder statutes
broadly restate the common law doctrine without any restrictions,5'
mostjurisdictions have modified the common law rule. Somejurisdictions have mitigated the doctrine by requiring that the defendant exhibit a mens rea in addition to the mere intent to commit a felony?*
Although New Hampshire is the only state that has adopted the Model
Penal Code f0rmulation,5~which provides a rebuttable presumption
other states have required
of recklessness and extreme indiieren~e,5~
varying degrees of intent. Delaware's homicide statute requires criminal negligence for a first degree felony-murder charge based upon an
enumerated felony; otherwise, the prosecution must prove recklessn e ~ s . 5Arkansas
~
requires that the actor cause the death under circumstances requiring extreme indifference to human life?6
Tennessee requires a mens rea of reckles~ness.~'
Other jurisdictions have mitigated the felony-murder rule by
downgrading the offense and reducing the applicable penalty.58
51. See, e.g., GA.CODEANN.

5 16-51(c) (Michie 1992);IOWACODE5 707.2 (1979);

KAN.STAT.ANN. 5 21-3401 (a) (Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN.LAtvs ANN. ch. 265,s 1 (West

1990);N.M. STAT.ANN. 5 30-2-1(A) (Michie 1984); S.C. CODEANN. 5 16-3-10 (Law Coop 1985);TEX.PENAL
CODEANN. 5 19.02(a) (3) (West 1989); VA. CODEANN.5 18.2-32
(Michie Supp. 1993).
52. Although the drafters of the Model Penal Code originally concluded that the
felony-murder rule should be abandoned, concern over political opposition led them
to insert a provision in the definition of reckless murder that states that recklessness
and extreme indifference to human life are presumed if the actor is engaged in a
felony-murder situation. SeeMoDEL PENALCODE5 210.2(1) (b) (Official Draft 1962);
MODELPENAL
CODE5 201.2 cmt 4 (Tent Draft No. 9 1959); Herbert Wechsler, Codzjication of Criminal Law in the United Stah: The Mo&l Penal Code, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 1425,
1446 (1968).
53. N.H. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 630:l-6 (1986) (effective 1974).
54. The New Hampshire formulation provides a rebuttable presumption of recklessness in its second degree murder statute if the defendant is engaged in the commission of certain enumerated felonies. Id. 5 630:l-b. Its first degree murder statute
requires a showing of knowledge or purpose. Id. 5 630:l-a (Supp. 1992).
55. DEL.CODEANN. tit 11, 5 635-636 (Supp. 1992).
56. ARK. CODEANN. 5 510-101, 102 (Michie Supp. 1991).
57. TENN.CODEANN. 5 39-13202(a)(2) (1991).
58. The majority of jurisdictions, however, still classify felony-murder as firstdegree or capital murder. See, e.g., ALA. CODE5 13A-6-2 (1982); Aruz. REV. STAT.ANN.
5 13-1105(A) (1989); ARK. CODEANN. 5 510-101 (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. PENAL
CODE3 189 (West 1988); COLO.REV. STAT.5 18-3-101 (Supp. 1992); CONN.GEN.STAT.
ANN. 5 53a-54c (West 1985); DEL.CODEANN. tit. 11, 5 636 (Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE
ANN. 5 22-2401 (1991); GA. CODEANN. 5 16-5l(c) (Michie 1992); IDAHOCODE5 184003 (Supp. 1993); ILL.REV. STAT.ch. 9, para. 9-1 (Supp. 1993); IND.CODEANN. 5 3 5
42-1-1 (West Supp. 1992); IOWACODEANN. 5 707.2 (West 1979); KAN. STAT.ANN. § 213401(a) (Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN.LAIVS ANN. ch. 265, 5 1 (West 1990); MICH.COMP.
LAWS ANN. 5 750.316 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); MISS. CODEANN. 5 97-3-19 (Supp.
1992); Mo. REV. STAT.5 565.003 (1979); MONT.CODEANN. 5 455102 (1992); NEB.
REV. STAT.5 28-303 (1989); NEV.REV. STAT.5 200.030 (1991); N.J. STAT.ANN.5 2C:ll-
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Maine and Wisconsin have classified felony-murder as third degree
murder, with a minimum imprisonment of up to twenty years in
Maine and fifteen years in W i s c ~ n s i n . In
~ ~ Ohio, felony-murder is
treated as involuntary manslaughter with imprisonment of up to
twenty five years.60 Oklahoma, Utah, and Idaho seem to have downgraded the felony murder rule through imprecise drafts mans hi^.^^
Legislatures have also modified the felony-murder rule by providing an finnative defense for accomplices who did not participate in
the acts that caused the victim's death.=* For example, the Arkansas
statute provides the defendant with an affirmative defense if he did
not commit the homicidal act, was not armed, reasonably believed
that no other participant was armed, and reasonably believed that no
other participant intended to engage in conduct that could result in a
deatheG3
3 (West Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT.ANN. 30-2-1(A) (Michie 1984); N.C. GEN.STAT.
1417 (1992); N.D. CENT.CODE 12.1-16-01(1) (c) (1985); OHIOREV. CODEANN.
§ 2903.01 (Anderson 1993); O m . STAT.ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7 (West Supp. 1993); OR.
REV. STAT.§ 163.115 (I) (b) (1991); RI. GEN.LAWS 11-23-1 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law Coop 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. 22-164 (Supp. 1993);
TENN.CODEANN. 39-13-202 (1991); TEX. PENALCODEANN. § 19.02 (a) (3) (West
1989); UTAHCODEANN. 3 76-5-203 (Supp. 1992);VT. STAT.ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (Supp.
1992); VA. CODEANN. 18.2-32 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH.REV. CODEANN. § 9A-32030 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE$j61-2-1 (1992); WYO. STAT. 9 6-2-101 (Supp.
1992).
Although some states classify felony-murder as second degree murder, the penalties are still extremely harsh. See e.g., FLA.STAT.ANN. § 782.04 (West 1992); LA. REV.
STAT.ANN. 30.1 (West Supp. 1993); MINN.STAT.ANN. § 609.185 (West Supp. 1993);
N.H. REV. STAT.ANN. § 630:l-b (1986); N.Y. PENALLAW 125.25 (McKinney 1987);
PA. STAT.ANN. tit. 18, 2502(b) (1983).
59. ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 17-A, 1251 (West Supp. 1992); WIS. STAT. § 940.03
(Supp. 1992).
60. OHIOREV. CODEANN. 2929.11(A) (B) (I), 2903.04 (Anderson 1993). Ohio
also has an aggravated murder section which treats murders committed during enumerated felonies as capital offenses with greater punishment. Id 2903.01(B).
Under 2903.01(B), the required mens rea is purposell.
61. See Alderstein, supra note 31, at 259-60; see also IDAHOCODE 18-4003 (Supp.
1993); O m . STAT.ANN. tit. 21,§§ 701.7, '701.8 (West. Supp. 1993); UTAHCODEANN.
76-5-203 (Supp. 1992).
STAT.§ 1141-110 (1989); ARK. CODEANN. 5 5-10-101 (Michie
62. See, e.g., ALASKA
Supp. 1991); CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. 53a-54c (West 1985); ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit.
LAW
17-A, 202 (West 1983); N.J. STAT.ANN. 2C:ll-3 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL
§ 125.25 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-16-01 (1985); OR REV. STAT.
§ 163.115 (West Supp. 1993); WASH.REV. CODEANN. § 9k32.030 (West Supp. 1993).
63. ARK. CODE.ANN. 510-104(b) (Michie 1987). For examples of other states
whose statutes contain affirmative defenses, see COLO.REV. STAT.§ 18-3-101 (Supp.
1992); CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. 53a-54c (West 1985); ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 202 (West 1983); N.J. STAT.ANN. § 2C:ll-3 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENALLAW
§ 125.25 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-16-01 (1985); OR REV. STAT.
163.115 (Supp. 1993); WASH.REV. CODEANN. § 9A-32-030 (West Supp. 1993). Because the elements of the defense are conjunctive, there is no reported decision demonstrating an accomplice who has prevailed on the defense. See Richard Cosway, The
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Finally, the statutes of thirty-nine jurisdictions specifically enumerate the felonies that must be committed to give rise to a felonymurder charge.64 Some examples of these felonies are arson, rape,
robbery, and kidnapping.65 The enumerated felonies reflect the legislature's intent to deter the most dangerous and violent felonies.66
There are other revisions that some legislatures have adopted to
narrow the scope of the doctrine. In some codes, the victim of the
homicide must be someone other than one of the felons.67 Other
codes require that the death occur in the course of the felony or
within the immediate flight from the felony, thus restricting the time
period within which the defendant can be held liable.68
Revised Washington Criminal Code's Vital Structure: The Bur& o f h o f ; Felony M u r k , and
Justification Pr&m, 48 WASH.L. REV. 57, 76 (1972); Bernard E. Gegan, Criminal
Homicide in the M e d New York Penal Law, 12 N.Y.L. I?. 565, 690 (1966).
64. ALA. CODE !j 13A-6-2 (1982); ALASKA STAT. 1141-110 (1989); ARIZ. REV.
STAT.ANN. 5 13-1105 (1989); ARK. CODEANN. 510-101 (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL.
PENALCODE5 189 (West 1988); COLO.REV. STAT. 18-3401 (Supp. 1992); CONN.
GEN.STAT.ANN. § 53a-54c (West 1985); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 636 (Supp. 1992);
D.C. CODEANN. 22-2401 (1981); FLA.STAT.ANN. !j782-04 (West 1992); IDAHOCODE
18-4003 (Supp. 1993); ILL. REV.STAT.ch. 9, para. 9-1 (Supp. 1993); IND.CODEANN.
§ 35-42-1-1 (West Supp. 1992); LA REV. STAT. ANN. 30.1 (West Supp. 1993); ME.
REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 17-A, 202 (West Supp. 1992); MICH.COMP.LAWS ANN. 5 750.316
(West 1991); MIS. CODEANN. 5 97-3-19 (Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. 565.003
(1979); MONT.CODEANN. 5 455402 (1992); NEB.REV. STAT. § 28-303 (1989); NEV.
REV. STAT. 200.030 (1991); N.J.STAT.ANN. § 2C:ll-3 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL
LAW 125.25 (McKinney 198'7); N.C. GEN.STAT. § 1417 (1992); N.D. CENT.CODE
5 12.1-16-01 (1985); Orak STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7 (West Supp. 1993); OR REV.
STAT. $163.1 15 (1991); PA. STAT.ANN. tit. 1 8 , s 2502(b) (1983); RI. GEN.LAWS § 112301 (Supp. 1992), S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. 5 22-164 (Supp. 1993); TENN.CODE
ANN. 39-13-202 (1991); UTAHCODEANN. § 76-5203 (Supp. 1992);VT. STAT.ANN. tit.
13, 2301 (Supp. 1992); VA CODEANN. 5 18-2-32 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH.REV.
CODEANN. 5 9A-32-030 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE 61-2-1 (1992); Wrs. STAT.
ANN. 940.03 (West Supp. 1992); Wo. STAT.5 6-2-101 (Supp. 1992).
65. See, e.g., ARK. CODEANN. 5-10-101 (Michie Supp. 1991); DEL.CODEANN. tit.
11, J! 636 (Supp. 1992); Mrs. CODEANN. § 97-3-19 (Supp. 1992); WASH.REV. CODE
ANN. 5 9A-32-030 (West Supp. 1993).
66. Interestingly, the stated purpose of writing the underlying felonies to certain
enumerated ones in New York was to "exclude rare instances of accidental or not
reasonably foreseeable htality, and especially those that might happen to occur in a
most unlikely manner in the course of a non-violent felony." STAFFNOTESOF THE
COhfhf1SS10N ON REVISION OF THE PENALLAW, PROPOSED
NEWYORKPENALLAW 275
(1965). Thus, the limitation seems to go towards limiting causation rather than deterring the underlying felony. See also N.Y. PENALLAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1983) (Practice Commentary).
67. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.5 1141-110 (1989); COLO.REV. STAT. 18-3-101 (Supp.
1992); CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. § 53a-54c (West 1985); N.J. STAT.ANN. 2C:ll-3 (West
Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENALLAW 125.25 (McKinney 1987); OR REV. STAT. 5 163.115
(1991); UTAHCODEANN. 76-5-203 (Supp. 1992);WASH.REV. CODEANN. 9A-32-030
(West Supp. 1993).
68. See, e.g., AUL CODE5 13A-6-2 (1992); ALSKA STAT. § 11.41.110 (1989); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (1989); ARK. CODEANN. 510-101 (Michie Supp. 1991);
COLO.REV. STAT. 5 18-3-101 (Supp. 1992); CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. 5 53a-54c (West
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Besides the modifications created by state legislatures, courts
have imposed restrictions and limitations through their interpretations of the doctrine. Some of these modifications were eventually
adopted by the legislature as part of the statutory lang~age,6~
while
others arise as a result of construing ambiguous lang~age.'~There
are also courtcreated modifications that exist in addition to the requirements of the statute?'
Despite the strbstantial amount of criticism supporting the abolition of the doctrine, the doctrine continues to be viable. The Model
Penal Code has had virtually no impact on reforming the doctrine; as
a result of piecemeal changes, state statutes are frequently ambiguous
and inconsistent. Rather than clarifying these ambiguities, the courts
have added to the confusion through court imposed changes and restrictions. Perhaps the longevity of the doctrine is an indication of the
current societal view towards crime and morality. Instead of abolishing the doctrine, the legislature should concentrate on creating a statute that is unambiguous, that can be facilely construed by the courts,
and that represents society's need to punish deserving defendants.

Generally, crimes are divided into two elements: mens rea and
actus reas.'* Mens rea is the mental state neede'd to complete the
crime while actus reas is the wrongful act committed by the defend1985); DEL.CODEANN.
tit. 11, § 636 (Supp. 1992);ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 17-A, § 202
(West 1983); Mom. CODEANN. § 455102 (1992); N.H. REV. STAT.ANN. 3 630:l-b
(1986); N.J.STAT.ANN. 5 2C:ll-3 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL
LAW 5 125.25 (McKinney 1987);N.D. CENT. CODE5 12.1-16-01 (1985); OR. REV. STAT.§ 163.115 (1991);
PA. STAT.ANN. tit. 18, 5 2502(b) (1983); TEX.PENALCODEANN. § 19.02(a) (3) (West
1989); UTAHCODEANN. § 76-5203 (Supp. 1992);WASH.REV. CODEANN. § 9A.32.030
(West Supp. 1993) (all requiring either immediate flight or in the course of the
felony).
69. For example, Alabama included the inherently dangerous limitation in the
text of its statute. ALA. CODE§ 13A-&2(a)(3) (1975 & Supp. 1993) (stating that a
person who causes the death of another in the course of a felony that is inherently
dangerous to human life commits murder).
70. For example, compare People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361 (Cal. 1971) (holding
that the felony of possession of a concealable weapon by an ex-felon is not a felony
inherently dangerous to human life) urith State v. Goodseal, 553 P.2d 279 (Kan. 1976)
(holding that a jury must decide in the light of the circumstances whether the felony
is inherently dangerous and that a convicted felon's possession of a firearm used to
frighten a victim is a felony inherently and foreseeably dangerous to human life,
therefore supporting a conviction of felony murder). Another example is the construction of "immediate flight." See People v. Gladman, 359 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1976)
(holding that immediate flight is a question of fact for the jury).
71. See Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1978) (holding that, in addition to
statutory requirements, the purpose of the felony must be independent of the
killing).
72. See generaUy LAEAVE& Scorr, supra note 44, at 7.
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ant?3 Where a crime requires a specific result, such as a death, the
prosecution must also prove that the defendant caused the result.74
The common law felony-murder doctrine generally states that if a
death occurs in the course of the commission or attempted commission of a felony, the defendant is guilty of homicide, even if there was
no intent to cause the death?5 Thus, unlike traditional crimes, felonymurder has no mens rea requirement for the homicide as long as
there is intent to commit the underlying felony.76 Although no mens
rea is required for the homicide, there still must be a causal relationship between the underlying felony and the resulting homicide.
There must be a connection (more than mere coincidence bemeen time and place) between the conduct and the result of the conduct in order to satisfy the element of causation in any result-oriented
crime.77 In crimes with mens rea, the conduct must have factually
caused the result, and the forbidden result which actually occurs must
be similar to the result or manner that the defendant intended.78
This ensures that the defendant may fairly be held responsible for the
actual result even if the result occurs in a diierent way than that intended by the defendant.79 In the felony-murder situation, however,
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Courts have used diierent rationales to support the lack of mens rea. Some
courts have held that the intent of the underlying felony is transferred to the intent to
commit the murder. See Shanahan v. United States, 354 k 2 d 524,526 (D.C. 1976)
(holding that intent is implied from the commission of the underlying felony) (citing
Goodall v. U.S., 180 F.2d 397, 399-400 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Other courts have determined that no intent is required. See, e.g., People v. Root, 524 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir.
1975) (holding that intent to kill is not required under the felony-murder rule).
Some courts have held that there is constructive intent. See, e.g., Commontvealth ex re1
Smith v. Myers, 261 k 2 d 550,553 (Pa. 1970) (holding the malice necessary to make a
killing murder is constructively inferred from the malice incident to the perpetration
of the initial felony). See generally Note, Felony Murder: A Tort Law Recmceptualiurtion,
99 W v . L. REV. 1918, 1920 (1986) (comparing the absence of mens rea in felonymurder to tort concepts); Roth & Sundby, supfa note 35, at 453-60 (conceptualizing
the lack of mens rea as transferred or constructive intent).
77. People v. Mulcahy, 149 N.E. 266 (Ill. 1925).
78. Set; e.g., State v. Hall, 633 P.2d 398 (Ariz. 1981). The felon's blows to the
victim's head caused immobility and hospitalization. Id. at 400. Although the victim
later died of a pulmonary embolism, this was held to be a natural consequence of
immobilization. Id. at 40304.
79. This scenario assumes that the required mens rea for the crime is intent. If
the required mens rea is recklessness or negligence, then the forbidden result must
be similar enough to and occur in a manner which the defendant's reckless or negligent conduct created a risk of happening. For further discussions of causation in
general, SeeJE~ohlEHw,
GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL
h w ch. 8 (2d ed. 1960);
WAVE
& SCOTT,supfa note 44, at 246-67; Sanford H. Kadish, CompliciEy, Cause and
Blame: A Study in t h Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323 (1985); David J. Karp,
Cawatim in the Model Penal Code, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 1249 (1978); Paul K. Ryu, Causation in Criminal h w , 106 U. PA. L. REV. 773 (1958).

Heinonline - - 71 U. Det. Mercy

235 1993-1994

236

CJMUBSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LAW REKEW

lvot 71:223

where intent is not required, liability for a caused death results not
because the felon intended to kill the victim, but because he had a
different bad intention (committing a felony) and was acting in a way
to carry out that different intention. Thus, the causation analysis becomes a little different in cases proceeding under a theory of felonymurder. The result of the defendant's acts can no longer be viewed in
relation to the defendant's intent to cause that result.
When a victim is killed during the course of a felony by one of the
felons, the causation analysis is generally not problematic. The courts
generally look at whether the death is a foreseeable result of the unthe court held that
derlying felony. For example, in State v. Cas~er,*~
there was sufficient evidence for a felony-murder conviction when the
victim of an attempted robbery, upon being threatened with castration, ran into a river, where his dead body was found a few days later.
Similarly, a defendant was found guilty of felony-murder when an elderly victim suffered a heart attack three days after an attempted robbery?' Both of these courts held that it was foreseeable that the
defendant's conduct could lead to the victimsydeaths.82 Because the
felon came prepared to engage in violence towards a particular victim,
and violence in fact occurred, it does not offend principles of fairness
to find that the felonious conduct caused the death.
This can easily be distinguished, however, from the situation
where someone is killed by someone other than one of the felons. In
this scenario, it is possible that the felons did not even have a weapon
at the time that they committed the felony?% In that situation, not
only did the defendant not intend the result, but it is also possible that
he did not intend the circumstances that led up to the resulting
dealth. Consequently, one of the areas of causation in felony-murder
cases that continues to give difficulty to both legislatures and courts is
the question of whether to extend liability to co-felons who did not
actually perform the act of killing. The courts have used the causation

80. 219 N.W.2d 226 (Neb. 1974).
81. In re Anthony M., 471 N.E.2d 447 (N.Y. 1984).
82. State v. Casper, 219 N.W. 2d 226 (Neb. 1974); In re Anthony M., 471 N.E.2d at
448; see also State v. Arnaro, 436 So. 2d 1056 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a
defendant who has already been arrested and is out of the house is criminally liable
when a co-felon kills a police officer who is searching the house).
83. For example, in State v. Chambers, 373 N.E.2d 393-94 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977),
the defendant and his partner, who were both unarmed, were surprised by the owner
of the home they were burglarizing. The owner shot and killed one of the felons as
he attempted to escape. Id. at 394. Although Ohio does not have a felony-murder
rule, it is involuntary manslaughter for a person to "cause the death of another as a
proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commitn a felony.
OHIOREV. CODEANN. 5 2903.04(A) (Anderson 1993). The court convicted the c e
felon for the death of his partner, concluding that the killing was a foreseeable consequence of the felony. Chambers,373 N.E.2d at 396.
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analysis to restrict the doctrine in these situations because of the inherent injustice that could be part of a finding of liability?4
There are many factual variations of this scenario. If the defendant and his accomplices commit a felony on a victim, the act causing
the death can originate from the defendant, codefendant, victim, police officer, or even an innocent bystander. That act can cause the
death of a codefendant, victim, police officer, or an innocent by~tander.8~
Some of these scenarios are less problematic than others.
When the act causes the death of a co-felon, liability has generally not
been extended to a surviving fel0n.8~When the act of killing is done
by a co-felon and results in the death of a police officer, innocent
bystander or victim, liability has generally been extended to all of the
co-felons?' Finally, where a victim or innocent bystander is killed because he has been used as a shield or taken hostage by a defendant,
liability has been extended regardless of who did the act of killing.88
Considerable confusion and inconsistency remain in those cases
where the act of killing is done by a police officer, victim, or innocent
bystander, and the act results in the death of a police officer, victim,
or innocent bystander. In determining whether there should be liability, courts have construed felony-murder statutes according to diferent causation doctrines. Depending on which doctrine is used, the
results of the analysis vary considerably.

A. Statutory Language of Causation
Although most causation analysis is common law, some states
have dealt with causation through statutes. The threshold requirement of statutory interpretation is that if a statute is unambiguous, the
84. Chambers, 373 N.E.2d at 395.
85. For a further discussion, see Walter H. Hitchler, The K i k and his Victim in
Felony-Murder Cas~ases, 53 DICK.
L. REV. 3 (1948); Frederick C. Moesel, Jr., A Suruey of
Felony Murder, 28 TEMP.L.Q. 453 (1955).
86. Many statutes now specifically contain language that limits the doctrine to
situations where the person kilIed is not a participant in the felony. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. 5 11-41-110 (1989); COLO.REV. STAT. § 18-3-101 (Supp. 1992); CONN.GEN.
STAT.ANN. 5 53a-54c (West 1985); N.J. STAT.ANN. 5 2C:ll-3 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y.
PENALLAW 5 125.25 (McKinney 1987); OR REV. STAT. 5 163.115(1) (b) (1991); VA.
CODEANN. § 18-2-32 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH.REV. CODEANN. 5 9A-32-030 (West
Supp. 1993).
Even in states where the statutes do not contain that language, courts have held
that a defendant is not liable for a codefendant's death under the felony-murder doctrine. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130,133 (Cal. 1965); People v. Austin,
120 N.W.2d 766,775 (Mich. 1963); State v. Canola, 374 k 2 d 20,30 (N.J.1977).
87. See Campbell v. State, 444 k 2 d 1034 (Md. 1982) (discussing the felony-murder doctrine).
88. See Jackson v. State, 408 k 2 d 711, 719 n.5 (Md. 1979) (stating that courts
generally reason that the defendant's action in forcing the victim into such a dangerous position is as much a cause of the death as if the defendant had actually fired the
fatal shot) (citing Wilson v. State, 68 S.W.2d 100 (Ark. 1934)).
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court must apply its plain meaning to resolve the question before it.89
Thus, the easiest way to determine which causation theory to apply is
if the statute itself clearly states the applicable requirement.
Generally, the statutory language falls into two categories. Some
statutes do not contain the word "cause" at all, but instead require
that the murder be committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain felonies?" Other statutes contain language that
states that a person is guilty of felony-murder when he commits or
attempts to commit a felony, and in the course of or in furtherance of
such crime, he causes the death of a person?' This statutory language
neither specifies the theory of causation nor does it tell the court what
to do in those cases where the fatal shot is fired by someone other
than one of the defendants.
There have been some states that have drafted statutes to specifically explain the causation requirement. For example, the old New
York felony-murder statute made "the killing of a human being murder in the first degree, when done without a design to effect death by
a person engaged in the commission of or in an attempt to commit a
felony . . . ."92 Thus, this statute, by its particular wording, seemed to
require that the killing be committed by the defendant or a ~ o - f e l o n . ~ ~
Another example is Maine's felony-murder statute which provides that
a person is guilty if "acting alone or with one or more other persons in
the commission of or attempt to commit, or immediate flight after
committing [enumerated felonies] the person or another participant
in fact causes the death of a human being, and the death is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such commission, attempt, or
flight.n94Thus, under the Maine statute, it does not matter who fired
89. See F. REED DICKERSON,THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION
OF STATUTES
229-33 (1975); NORMAN
J. SINGER,SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY
CONSTRU~O
5 46.01
N
(5th ed. 1992).
90. See, e.g., CAL. PENALCODE5 189 (West 1988); FLA.STAT.ANN. 5 782.04 (West
1992); IDAHOCODE5 18-4003 (Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT.ANN. 5 21-3401(a) (Supp.
1992); LA. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 30.1 (West Supp. 1993); NEB.REV. STAT5 28-303 (1989);
NEV. REV. STAT.5 200.030 (1991); N.M. STAT.ANN. 5 30-2-1(A) (Michie 1984); N.C.
.
S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS
GEN.STAT.5 1417 (1992); RI. GEN.LAWS § 11-23-1 ( S ~ p p1992);
ANN. 5 22-164 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE5 61-2-1 (1992); WYO. STAT. 5 62-101
(Supp. 1992).
STAT.5 11-41-110 (1989); ARIZ.
91. See, e.g., ALA. CODE5 13A&2 (1982); ALASKA
REV. STAT. ANN. 5 131105(A) (1989); ARK. CODEANN. fj 510-101 (Michie Supp.
1991); CONN.GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 53a-54c (West 1985); D.C. CODEANN. 5 22-2401
(1991); MASS. GEN.LAWS ANN. ch. 265, 5 1 (West 1990); N.D. CENT.CODE5 12.1-16
Ol(1) (c) (1985); OR. REV. STAT. 3 163.115(1)(b) (1991); TEX. PENALCODEANN.
§ 19.02 (West 1989); UTAH CODEANN. 5 765203 (Supp. 1992); WASH.REV. CODE
ANN. 5 9A-32-030 (West Supp. 1993).
92. People v. Wood, 167 N.E.2d 736 (N.Y. 1960).
93. Id.
94. ME. REV. STAT.ANN tit 17-A, 5 202 (West Supp. 1992). The Penal Code in
Maine also has a provision that specifically defines causation to require both factual
causation and foreseeability. Id. 5 33.
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the fatal shot as long as the death of the victim is reasonably
f~reseeable?~
Similarly, the Colorado statute states that a person is guilty of felony-murder if, during the course of a felony, the death of a person,
other than one of the participants is caused by any0ne.9~Therefore, it
does not matter who fired the fatal shot under the Colorado statute.
In New Jersey, the legislature specifically amended the felonymurder statute in response to a decision that held that a felon could
not be liable for the death of a co-felon caused by someone resisting
the commission of the felony?' The legislature responded by amending the felony-murder statute to eliminate the requirement that the
death be caused by one of the participants and provided that the requirement was satisfied if the death was caused by "any person."g8 By
making this change, the legislature made it clear that a felon could be
held liable under the felony-murder doctrine even if the death was
caused by the victim.
In 1981, the New Jersey Legislature again amended the felonymurder rule by deleting the requirement that the death occur in furtherance of the commission of the felony?' As explained by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the legislature was concerned that the "in
furtherance" language might result in a felon avoiding liability if the
death was caused by a non-participant such as a victim or police
officer.'OO Thus, the purpose of the amendments was to ensure
95. State v. Reardon, 486 k 2 d 112 (Me. 1984).
96. COLO.REV. STAT.5 18-3-102 l(b) (Supp. 1993). But see sources cited supra
note 86 and accompanying text
97. State v. Canola, 374 k 2 d 20 (NJ. 1977). In Canola, four felons attempted to
rob a jewelry store. Id. During the course of the robbery, the owner killed one of the
felons and then was killed himself. Id. at 21. The defendant was convicted of felonymurder of both the owner and the co-felon. Id. The appellate division affirmed the
conviction and the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that a felon could
not be liable for any death, even of a non-felon, when the death was caused by someone other than a participant in the felony. Id at 30. Thus, Canola limits the felonymurder rule to killings committed by a participating felon.
98. State v. Martin, 573 k 2 d 1359 (N.J. 1990) (construing the legislative
amendments).
99. Id. at 1371.
100. The committee statement that accompanied the amendment reads:
Under 2C:ll-3, a person committing a serious crime (i.e. robbery or
arson) is guilty of murder if during the course of or in furtherance of that
crime a homicide occurs. This is what is commonly referred to as the "felony-murder" doctrine. The felony-murder provision is only intended to prohibit murder prosecutions in cases where the victim is a co-felon. However,
including in this definition the phrase "in furtherance OFcould be read to
preclude prosecution for murder in certain circumstances. For instance,
when during a robbery, the shopkeeper fires at the robber but instead kills
an innocent bystander, the robber might not be charged with murder because, although the killing occurred during the course of the robbery, the
killing was not in furtherance of the robbely. Therefore, in order to clarify
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that the felony-murder rule applies regardless of who fires the fatal
shot.lO'
Additionally, New Jersey's Penal Code includes a statutory definition of causation.lo2 Although the felony-murder statute does not define causation, the New Jersey court has held that the penal code
defines causation not only for intentional homicide, but for all crimes
including felony-murder.lo3 According to the statute, the causation
element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct.lo4 The court has interpreted that language to require the prosecution to prove that the death occurred in
the course of the crime, that the death would not have occurred but
for the crime, and that the death is not too remote or accidental in its
occ~rrence.'~~
Thus, jurisdictions have used diierent statutory language to define the parameters of the causation doctrine under the felony-murder rule. In many jurisdictions, however, the statute is silent with
respect to how a nonparticipant killing of an innocent party should be
addressed. The courts have therefore used various theories of causation to resolve that question.

that a robber could be charged with murder under such circumstances, section 14 would delete the phrase "in furtherance of" from 2C:ll-3.
Id (quoting SENATE
JUDICIARY C O M M ~STATEMENT
E,
TO SENATE
COMM.
SU,No. 1537, § 14 (1981)).
101. Many states have helpful information about the way that the felony-murder
statute should be interpreted in the Committee comments. See, e.g., Aruz. REV. STAT.
ANN. 5 13-203 (1989); DEL.CODEANN. tit 11, § 261 (1987); HAW.REV. STAT.§ 702214 (1985); KY. REV. STAT.ANN. § 501.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Meml1990);Mom. CODE
ANN. !j45-2-201 (1992); N.J.STAT.ANN. 2C2-3 (West Supp. 1992);PA.STAT.ANN. tit.
18, 5 302 (1983).
102. N.J.
STAT.ANN. 2C2-3 (West Supp. 1992).
103. Martin, 573 k 2 d at 1371-72. That reasoning is also supported by a 1985 addition to the Model Penal Code commentary on section 2.03(4), which states that:
The most important application [of the causation requirement] may be in
jurisdictions where strict liability continues to play a role in determining the
gravity of some offenses. Under the felony-murder rule, for example, a person committing a felony is strictly liable for deaths caused during the felony.
The principle of this subsection is that there should be no liability unless the
actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct. Thus, s u p
pose the moment a bank robber stepped into the bank, an employee pushing the button for a burglar alarm was electrocuted. The robber would not
be liable for the death of the employee.
In general, strict liability is based on a desire to secure extreme care in
areas in which it is imposed. This objective is not significantly furthered by
finding liability for improbable results, nor would such an approach be just.
Id at 1371-72 (quoting MODELPENAL
CODE 2.03(4) cmt. at 264 (1985)).
104. N.J. STAT.ANN. 2C2-3 (West Supp. 1992).
105. Martin, 573 A.2d at 1364.
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of Causation

Although courts have used the agency theory as a theory of causation, it really rests on the act requirement.lo6 The agency theory, borrowed from principles of conspiracy, is based on the premise that coconspirators are only responsible for acts done in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and not for those act committed outside the common design. The premise was extended to the felony-murder doctrine, resulting in the conclusion that there can be no liability unless the act
causing the death is an act of one of the felons that occurs in furtherance of the felony. Accordingly, under this theory, neither a defendant nor his confederates can be liable if the act of killing is done by a
police officer, innocent bystander, or victim. The identity of the killer
becomes the threshold requirement for finding liability under the felony-murder doctrine.lo7
Courts that have adopted the agency theory have done so based
on different rationales. For example, in State v. Carnpbel&lo8a co-felon
was killed during an armed robbery by nine bullet wounds, two that
were inflicted by the victim and seven that were inflicted by a police
officer.log The Maryland felony-murder statute provided that "all
murder which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt
to perpetrate
armed robbery
shall be murder in the first degree."'1° The court held that no criminal liability could be imputed
to the surviving felon when the lethal act was committed by a nonfelon.lll The court reasoned that the statute required that the killing
be committed in the perpetration of the felony and that the language
of the statute dictated that the act be committed by a felon or one of

...

...

106. Moesel, supra note 85, at 461. A classic statement of the agency theory appears in Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541 (1863). The defendant was participating in a riot. Id. The issue was whether under the felony-murder doctrine, the
defendant could be guilty of murder if another person was killed by a soldier who was
resisting the mob's attack. Id at 54546. The court held:
There can be no doubt of the general rule of law, that a person engaged in
the commission of an unlawful act is legally responsible for all of the consequences which may naturally or necessarily flow from it, and that, if he combines and confederates with others to accomplish an illegal purpose he is
liable . . for the acts of each and all who participate with him . . As they
all act in concert for a common object, each is the agent for all the others,
and the acts done are therefore the acts of each and all. .. [N]o person can
be held guilty of homicide unless the act is either actually or constructively
his, and it cannot be his act in either sense unless committed by his own
hand or by some one acting in concert with him . ."
Id. at 54344.
107. Moore v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1253, 1255 (8th Cir. 1985).
108. 444 k 2 d 1034 (Md. 1981).
109. Id. at 1036.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1037.

.

. .

.

..
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his confederates."* Because this killing was committed to thwart the
felony and not to perpetrate it, the felony-murder statute did not
apply.l13
In a case involving similar facts, a California court also refused to
extend liability to a defendant when a co-felon was killed by a victim
during the course of an attempted robbery.'14 Again, the court reasoned that the felony-murder statute requires that the felon or an accomplice commit the killing; otherwise, the killing does not
perpetrate the felony. "To include such killings within section 189
would expand the meaning of the words 'murder. . .which is committed in the perpetration. . . [of] robbery' beyond common understanding."'15 The court specifically stated, however, that it did not make
this finding based on the identity of the person who fired the fatal
shot.l16 Instead, the court recast the issue as whether a defendant can
be convicted of murder for the killing of any person by another who is
resisting the felony.'''
In Alvera v. District Court ofDenver,l18a Colorado court applied
the agency theory, but based the application of the theory on a different rationale. In Alvera, a police officer, mistaking the victim for one
of the robbers, killed him with a shotgun blast to the head.llg The
Colorado felony-murder statute provides that a person is guilty of
112. Id. at 1042.
113. Id. at 1038.
114. People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965).
115. Id. at 133. But Caliiornia has created a unique kind of vicarious liability
called provocative act murder to find liability when a killing is committed by a
nonfelon. Id. at 134. In a series of cases, the Caliiornia courts have held that a defendant may be vicariously liable for the lethal acts of someone resisting the felony if
the defendant, by engaging in conduct that is likely to kill, acts with conscious disregard for human lie. Id. This mle was first enunciated in Washington,where the robbery victim killed one of the felons. Id. at 132. Although the court held that the
felony-murder rule did not apply, the court determined that a defendant who initiates
a gun battle may be found liable for murder if his victims resist and someone is killed.
Id. at 134. Under these circumstances, the defendant has shown a "'wanton disregard
for human lie. ..'" Id. (quoting People v. Thomas, 261 P.2d 1 , 7 (Cal. 1953)); see also
People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1965), vacated on othergrounds,Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
In Taylor v. Superior Court, 477 P.2d 131 (Cal. 1970), the court extended the
scope of this theory by holding that threats alone can be sufficient to hold a defendant liable for a killing committed by a resisting victim. If felons initiate gunfire by
their threatening conduct, they can be vicariously liable for a resulting death. Id. at
135. This approach seems to be more of a change in terminology than a departure
from the felony-murder doctrine. In discussing the California approach, a Nevada
court noted a trial court's observation that a "rose, the felony murder rule, is still a
rose by any other name, vicarious liability." Sheriff v. Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768 n.7
(Nev. 1973).
116. Washington, 402 P.2d at 134.
117. Id.
118. 525 P.2d 1131 (Colo. 1974) (en banc).
119. Id.at1131.
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murder when he "commits or attempts to commit. . robbery. . .and
in the course of or in furtherance of the crime . . . or of immediate
flight therefrom . . . the death of a person, other than one of the
participants, is caused . . . ."120 The trial court held that where a participant mistakenly kills a nonparticipant during the course of a felony, the perpetrators of the felony are criminally responsible.l2l The
Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the act of killing
must be committed by a felon or co-fe10n.l~~
The court concluded that the statutory language failed to designate who must cause the death for criminal liability to attach.123 The
court looked to legislative history and determined that the legislative
intent was to narrow the application of the rule.124 The court reasoned that the new statute was identical in meaning to its predecessor
and that felony-murder was therefore to remain limited to killings by
one of the parti~ipants.'~~
The dissent, however, noted that the statutory language is in plain English and argued that the wording s u p
ports only one conclusion: Who does the killing is irrelevant as long
as there is proximate cause.126
Thus, even when the court articulates a diierent rationale for
using the agency theory, the reasoning still seems to be based on an
interpretation of the old felony-murder statute that requires that the
killing occur in the perpetration of the felony. The effect, however, of
applying the agency theory is that the state must prove as a threshold
matter that the defendant, or an accomplice, actually killed the victim.
If the state cannot establish this element, the defendant cannot be
found guilty of felony-murder.127
120. Id. at 1132.
121. Id. at 1131.
122. Id. at 1132.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1134.
127. The Pennsylvania courts first provided insight into the problems associated
with the two theories of causation. In Commonwealth v. Almeida, 68 k 2 d 595 (Pa.
1949), cert. dm24 339 U.S.924 (1950), a police officer was killed by a bullet which
may have been fired by another police officer. Based on the proximate cause theory,
the court held that the felon was guilty of murder because the killing was a natural
consequence of the robbely. Id. at 601. In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 117 k 2 d 204
(Pa. 1955), the court continued to extend the felon's liability, holding a felon liable
for the death of a cufelon who was killed by the intended victim. The court reasoned
that the death of a cufelon was just as foreseeable as the death of an innocent bystander. Id. at 206.
In Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 k 2 d 472 (Pa. 1958), the court overruled
Thomas,holding that the rule enunciated in Almeih does not apply when the person
killed is a cufelon. The court based its decision on the reasoning that because the
killing of the cufelon was justifiable, it could not support a charge of murder. Id. at
483. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Myers, 261 k 2 d 550 (Pa. 1970), the court overruled Almeida and adopted the agency theory of liability. In rejecting the reasoning
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2. Proximate Causation
Another theory of causation is borrowed from tort law. Under
the tort concept of proximate ~ a u s a t i o n , ' the
~ ~ defendant must have
a duty to the plaintiff, the risk must be the actual or a "but for" cause
of the result, and the risk must be fore~eeab1e.l~~
An intervening or
superseding event can break the chain of causation, absolving the defendant from liability.130 Courts that have applied these tort concepts
in the criminal context have used various combinations.
Some courts have found liability in felony-murder cases in the
absence of foreseeability, based only on "but for" causation. While
this approach has been given different names, such as "cause in fact,"
the test is the same: But for the defendant's act, the death would not
have occurred.131 In Wa& v. State of Oklahoma,132the defendant was
convicted of second degree murder under an Oklahoma statute that
imposes liability when a person effects the death of any individual
while engaged in the commission of certain felonies not enumerated
in the first degree murder statute. In upholding the conviction, the
court held that under the felony-murder doctrine, the state is not required to establish that the felony perpetrated by the defendant is the
proximate cause of the victim's death.133 The only limitation on the

,

enunciated in Redline, the court held that "to make the result hinge on the character
of the victim is, in many instances, to make it hinge on the marksmanship of resister."
Id. at 558.
Numerous other jurisdictions have followed the agency theory and refused to
extend liability to a felon if it could not be proven that the defendant fired the Fatal
shot. See Commonwealth v. Balliro, 209 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1965) (felon found not
guilty where it could not be prove who fired the fatal bullet); Butler v. People, 18N.E.
338 (Ill. 1888) (felon found not guilty even though rowdy conduct resulted in the
killing of bystander by the town marshall). But see People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511
(Ill. 1974), cert. h i e d , 421 U.S. 913 (1975) (felon held liable for death of police officer shot accidentally by another police officer); Commonwealth v. Moore, 88 S.W.
1085 (Ky. 1905) (felon not guilty where victim of robbery killed a bystander); State v.
Oxedine, 122 S.E. 568 (N.C. 1924) (felon not guilty where victim of assault killed a
bystander).
128. For an indepth discussion, see Note, supra note 76, at 1918.
& KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS$5 42,43,
129. W. PAGEKEETONET AL., PROSSER
at 272-74 (5th ed. 1984).
130. Id. 5 42, at 273-75.
131. LaFave and Scott describe cause in fact as "'but for' the antecedent conduct
& Scorn, supra note 44, at 279. Compare
the result would not have occurred." MAVE
State v. Wiley, 698 P.2d 1244, 1259 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that defendant's act was an
act "but for" which the death would not have occurred); People v. Bowman, 669 P.2d
1369,1379 (Colo. 1983) (holding that defendant's act of committing arson was an act
"but for" which death of fireman would not have occurred). The problem with "but
for" causation is that it is always present since the outcome without the defendant's
conduct is impossible to predict. For a discussion of causation issues in relation to
cases involving drug overdoses, see Lynne H. Rambo, Note, An UnconstitutionalFiction:
The FelonpMur& Rule as A w i e d to the Supply of Drugs, 20 GA. L. REV. 671 (1986).
132. 581 P.2d 914 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
133. Id. at 915.

Heinonline - - 71 U. Det. Mercy

244 1993-1994

19941

WHOSE CRIME IS IT ANYWAY?

245

doctrine is that there must be a nexus between the underlying felony
and the death of the victim.134
In People v. Stamp,13*a robbery victim died of a heart attack twenty
minutes after the defendants committed the crime. The defendants
argued on appeal that the felony-murder doctrine was inapplicable
because the killing did not occur in perpetration of the fe10ny.l~~
Although the jury was instructed on the definition of proximate
cause,13' the appellate court specifically stated:
The [felony-murder] doctrine is not limited to deaths which
are foreseeable. . . . As long as the homicide is the direct
causal result of the robbery the felony-murder rule applies
whether or not the death was a natural or probable consequence of the robbery. So long as the victim's predisposing
physical condition, regardless of its cause, is not the only substantial factor bringing about his death, that condition, and
the robber's ignorance of it, in no way destroys the robber's
criminal responsibility for the death.138
Many courts, however, have required both "but for" causation
and "foreseeability." In State v. Moore,139a Missouri court examined
whether the defendant could be liable under the felony-murder doctrine for the death of an innocent bystander who was killed by an
intended victim who was attempting to abort an armed robbery. The
defendant argued on appeal that the felony-murder rule requires a
finding that the defendant or an accomplice fired the fatal shot.140
The felony-murder statute in effect at the time provided that "every
homicide which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate any . . . robbery . . . shall be deemed murder in the first
degree.9 ' 1 4 1
Although precedent seemed to indicate that Missouri followed
the agency theory, the court adopted the causation theory of proxi134.
135.
(1970).
136.
137.

Id. at916.
82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969), cert. h i e d sub nom, 400 U.S. 819

Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
The court stated in its instructions to the jury:
To constitute a felonious homicide there must be, in addition to the
death of a human being, an unlawful act which proximately caused that
death.
The proximate cause of death is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
death, and without which the result would not have occurred.
Id. at 603 n.4. The defendant objected to the instruction. I d at 600.
138. I d at 603 (citations omitted).
139. 580 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
140. Id. at 750.
141. Id.; Mo. REV. STAT.§ 559.010 (1969) (repealed September 28, 1975).
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mate cause.142 The court held that the test is whether the homicide is
a natural and proximate result of which the defendant was reasonably
bound to anticipate.143 If the felony sets in motion a chain of events
that were or should have been within the defendant's contemplation
at the time the act was instigated, then it is immaterial whether the
defendant fired the fatal b ~ 1 l e t . l The
~ ~ court in Mome found that it
was reasonably foreseeable that a robbery attempt would meet resista n ~ e . This
l ~ ~ set in motion the chain of events that caused the death
of the victim.146 Therefore, the conviction was affirmed.14'
Thus, depending on which approach the courts use, factually similar cases will produce very different results. In those states where the
felony-murder statute has been interpreted as embracing the proximate cause theory of causation, liability is not precluded even if the
defendant or an accomplice did not kill the victim. The state is not
required to prove the identity of the killer, but still must prove that
the felon's actions set in motion a chain of events that directly led to a
foreseeable death. Under the proximate cause theory, therefore, a
defendant can sometimes be held liable even when the shot is fired by
a victim, police officer, or bystander, and the death occurs to a victim,
police officer, or bystander.148
142. State v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747,751 (Mo. 1979).
143. Id. at 752.
144. Id at 751 (citingJohnson v. State, 386 P.2d 336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963)).
145. Id. at 752.
146. Id.
147. Following his conviction, the defendant sought habeas corpus relief on the
grounds that the Missouri state court-retroactivelyapplied a new and expansive construction of the Missouri felony-murder statute when it followed the proximate cause
theory of causation. Moore v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1253-54 (8th Cir. 1985). The circuit
court held that the change in law was constitutionallyunforeseeable and could not be
applied retroactively. Id. at 1258. Thus, the defendant's petition was granted. Id. at
1259.
148. The proximate cause theory has been used by some courts in determining
whether a felon can be liable under the felony-murder doctrine even when the fatal
shot comes from the hands of a third party. For example, in People v. Hickman, 319
N.E.2d 511 (Ill. 1974), a police officer was shot by a fellow police officer during the
course of police pursuit of the defendants, who were fleeing the scene of a burglary.
The court looked at the wording of the felony-murder statute, which stated that "[a]
person who kills an individual without lawfuljustification commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: . . [h]e is attempting to commit a forcible
felony." Id. at 512. The court referred to the committee notes to that section, which
stated that it is immaterial whether the killing is committed by a third party trying to
prevent the commission of the felony. Id. at 512-13.
The court held that based on Illinois statutory and case law, it did not matter who
fired the fatal shot as long as the resulting death is foreseeable. I d at 513-14 Because
it is foreseeable that an escape will invite "retaliation, opposition and pursuit," the
defendant could be liable for murder. I d at 513; see also People v. Allen, 309 N.E.2d
544 (Ill. 1974) (affirming the murder conviction of a conspirator for the slaying of a
police officer when the police officer was killed by another police officer).

.
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Under the agency theory of causation, however, there can be no
liability unless there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the shot
that killed the victim was fired by the defendant or an accomplice.
Thus, where it is unclear who fired the fatal shot, liability for the murder can never be imputed on to the defendant. The prosecution must
prove, as a threshold matter, the identity of the killer; for without that
information, the jury cannot examine the question of causation.
The present trend seems to be for courts to use the agency theory
to limit criminal culpability under the felony-murder doctrine to lethal acts committed by the felons themselves or their accomplices.149
Thus, courts in several jurisdictions have appeared to abandon the
proximate cause theory in favor of the agency theory.150
The result of these divergent approaches is that the liability of a
defendant depends not only on the state in which the defendant is
tried, but also on the court within that state. This is an unsatisfactory
result because the courts are using the agency theory of causation to
restrict the application of the felony-murder rule in a way that is not
necessarily consistent with principles of statutory analysis, societal
views about crime, and general criminal law principles.
The next section discusses the need for a more uniform approach
towards causation in felony-murder cases, and the last section proposes such a method. The methodology balances the need to prevent
unfettered application of the felony-murder doctrine with the need
for a careful, consistent analysis that provides the most just result.

The felony-murder rule is statutory. Yet, courts retain a powerful
role in interpreting and applying the rule because of imprecise language and the drafters' inability to anticipate different factual scena149. One reason for refusing to extend the felony-murder doctrine is that it would
not achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130,
133 (Cal. 1965). Another reason is that some courts feel that the tort liability concept
of proximate cause has no place in the criminal context because of the difference in
the underlying rationales of tort law and proximate cause. State v. Canola, 374 k 2 d
20,30 (N.J. 1977). The theory of proximate cause can be modified, however, so that
it provides a closer and more direct causal connection, thus in keeping with the diierences in the rationales.
150. Compare State v. Burton, 325 k 2 d 856,858-59 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1974)
(proximate cause) with Canola, 374 k 2 d at 22, 29 (agency); and Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 117 k 2 d 204 (Pa. 1955) (proximate cause) with Commonwealth v. Redline,
137k 2 d 472 (Pa. 1958) (agency, overruling Thomas); and Commonwealth v. Almeida,
68 k 2 d 595, 601-10 (Pa. 1949), cert. ah24 339 U.S. 924 (1950) (proximate cause)
with Commonwealth v. Myers, 261 k 2 d 550, 555-57 (Pa. 1970) (agency, overruling
Almeia'u). But compare People v. Garippo, 127 N.E. 75, 77-78 (Ill. 1920) (agency) with
Hickman, 319 N.E.2d at 513 (proximate cause, overruling Garippo); and State v. Majors, 237 S.W. 486,488 (No. 1922) (agency) with Moore, 580 S.W.2d at 752 (proximate
cause, overruling Majm)

.
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rios that come within its parameters.l5' The causation requirement
and its application to the factual scenario of a nonparticipant killing a
nonparticipant involves both of these problems. The courts have responded to these difficulties in various ways, often leading to inconsistent and faulty conclusions.
It is submitted that the true reasons for the confusion is the dissatisfaction with the felony-murder doctrine, and the courts' use of
the agency theory of causation as a means of limiting the doctrine.
This limitation distorts the felony-murder doctrine's requirement of
causation. Unless the statute is specifically written to require that a
felon fire the fatal shot, courts should use a modified theory of proximate cause to keep the doctrine within bounds. To illustrate the
problem, this section will examine the ways that the causation requirement has been interpreted under the New York felony-murder statute.
New York courts have been unable to reach a consistent view on
whether the felony-murder statute should be interpreted as embracing the agency theory or the proximate cause theory. For example,
the case of People v. Wood152has frequently been cited for the proposition that New York follows the agency theory.153 In Wood, a gun battle
outside a tavern resulted in the deaths of a bystander and a cofe10n.l~~
Shots were fired by the victim in an effort to assist the police
0E3cer.l~~
The felony-murder statute in effect at the time stated that
"the killing of a human being . . .is murder in the first degree, when
committed . . .without a design to effect death, by a person engaged
in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit, a felony."156 The
court of appeals upheld dismissal of the indictment, holding that the
legislature intended that the act of killing must be committed by one
of the felons for the felony-murder doctrine to apply.15' The court
relied in part on the "peculiar wordingn of the statute to conclude that
the word "person" must be a principal in the underlying felony.I5'
In 1965, the New York revised its felony-murder statute. It now
provides that a person is guilty of second degree murder when "acting
alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or attempts to
151. "Statutes as well as constitutional provisions at times embody purposeful ambiguity or are expressed with a generality for future unfolding." Justice Felix FrankL. REV. 527, 528 (1947).
furter, Some Reflectim on the Reading ofstatuta, 47 COLUM.
152. 167 N.E.2d 736 (N.Y. 1960).
153. For cases within New York, see People v. Matos, 568 N.Y.S.2d 683, 686 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1991); People v. Lewis, 444 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); People
v. Ozarowski, 344 N.E.2d 370, 375 (N.Y. 1976); People v. Jayner, 257 N.E.2d 26, 27
(N.Y. 1970). For cases outside of New York, see Alvarez v. District Court of Denver,
525 P.2d 1131-32 (Colo. 1974); Campbell v. State, 444 k 2 d 1034, 1039 (Md. 1984).
154. Wood, 167 N.E.2d at 737.
155. Id. at 738.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 740.
158. Id.
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commit [enumerated felonies] and in furtherance of such crime or of
immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be
any, causes the death of a person other than one of the particip a n t ~ . " ' Since
~ ~ the revision, the New York courts have been split on
whether the agency theory or the proximate cause theory applies.
This split has led to inconsistent results in the lower courts.
In People v. Ouraj,lGO
shots fired during a robbery resulted in the
victim's death. It could not be determined if the shots were fired by
the defendant or another victim.16' The court held that the present
statute requires the state to prove that the defendant fired the shot
under the agency theory.16* Similarly, in People v. R a r n o ~ 'the
~ ~victim
was killed during a burglary. It was unclear whether the defendant or
the victim's wife fired the fatal shot.164 The court held that the defendant must actually commit the homicidal act for the felony-murder
statute to a ~ p 1 y . l ~ ~
Other courts, however, have held that the felony-murder statute
a police officer was
requires proximate cause. In People v. FLrne~,'~~
killed during a high speed chase following a robbery. No witnesses
saw the actual crash nor was there any evidence of contact between
the defendant's vehicle and the police car.'67 Construing the element
of causation under the felony-murder statute, the court held that the
defendant's action must be found to be '"a sufficiently direct cause of
[the ensuing] death.'"'68 The ultimate harm does not have to be intended by the actor.'69 It is enough if the ultimate harm is something
that should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to the acts
of the defendant.170 The court held that although the defendant did
bring into motion a chain of events that led to the death of the police
officer, there was no affirmative act by the defendant that directly
caused the accident because there was no evidence of contact between
the vehicles.17' In addition, there were factors such as the condition
of the road that were considered to be a superseding event breaking
159. N.Y. PENAL
LAW 5 125.25(3) (McKinney 1991).
160. 431 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1980).
161. Id. at 926.
162. Id.
163. 496 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
164. Id. at 444.
165. Id.
166. 476 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1984).
167. Id. at 480.
168. Id. (quoting People v. Kibbe, 321 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 1974)). In Kibbe, the
homicide was prosecuted under a theory of depraved indifference to human life, not
felony-murder. Kibbie, 321 N.E.2d at 776. Nevertheless, the I.Yoes court held that the
analysis of proximate causation is the same as felony-murder. Id.
169. Fibres,476 N.Y.S. 2d at 480.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 481.
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the chain of ~ausati0n.l~~
Thus, the felony-murder charges against
the defendant were di~missed."~
In People v. ma to^,"^ a police officer was killed while pursuing the
defendant following a robbery. The police officer either fell or was
pushed over a roof during the chase.175 The defendant was charged
with felony-murder for the death of the police 0ffi~er.l'~The court
applied a two-prong test of causation: first, the defendant's conduct
must be an actual cause of death,177and,second, the death must be a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~
The court found that the element of causation was satisfied in this
case.179
The court also specifically stated that the applicable causation
analysis is that applied in all other homicide cases.lsO In distinguishing Ramos and the agency theory of causation, the court stated that
the cases were factually different because there was no evidence here
that anyone other than the defendant could have caused the police
officer to fall.lsl The court also noted that Wood had been decided
under the old felony-murder statute with its 'Lpeculiarwording," and
that the revised statute rejected that wording in favor of general language of causation.lS2 Thus, the court concluded that because the
facts did not involve a death caused by anyone other than the felon,
neither Ramos nor Wood app1ied.ls3 Instead, this case was governed by
ordinary rules of causation.lS4 The court further opined that in view
of the new penal code, a felon can be guilty of murder even if he did
not shoot the fatal bullet if he sets into motion a chain of events that
leads to death.ls5
Finally, in People v. Hernandfds6 the court rejected the defendant's reliance on Wood where a police officer was killed in a gun battle.
Although it could not be determined who had fired the fatal shot, the
court refused to dismiss the felony-murder charge.ls7 The court specifically held that Wood interpreted the predecessor statute and that in
adopting the new statute the legislature specifically deleted all lan-

--

--

-

-

Id.
Id.
568 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id. at 687.
Id.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 687.
Id.
Id.
Id.
588 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y.App. Div. 1992).
Id. at 569.
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guage that could be interpreted as the agency theory.ls8 The court
applied the ordinary rules of proximate causation, finding that it was
foreseeable that a bullet could go astray during a gun battle in a residential building.1sg In holding that the plain words of the statute require a finding of proximate cause, the court held that as long as the
defendant "sets in motion [the] machinery which ultimately results in
the victim's death," the defendant can be liable.lgO
Thus, the New York courts have reached diiering opinions on
the applicability of Wood and the agency theory of causation.lgl If the
agency theory is applied to that group of cases where the act of killing
is done by someone other than the defendant or one of his cohorts,
there can never be any liability imposed for the death of the victim,
police officer, or innocent bystander. The proximate cause theory, on
the other hand, allows liability as long as the defendant sets into motion a chain of events that leads to a foreseeable death. As the New
York courts seem to be realizing, this approach is more fair and is in
keeping with both statutory interpretation and the policies underlying
the felony-murder doctrine.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. The Florida courts have also had d i c u l t y in determining what causation
theory to apply. There are Florida cases which hold that a killing need not actually be
done by any of the perpetrators in order to support a felony-murder charge. See
Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955) (police officer shot by either robber or
fellow officer); G f i t h v. State, 171 So. 2d 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (bystander
shot by robbery victim). But see State v. Andreu, 222 So. 2d 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (police officer shot by fellow police officer held not to be felony-murder).
In Florida v. Williams, 254 So.2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), the court reviewed a case where a codefendant was killed while committing arson. Although the
court held that the surviving defendant could not be held liable for the death of his
accomplice, it held that the felony-murder statute is applicable when an innocent
person is killed as a result of circumstances set in motion by one or more persons
acting in furtherance of an intent to commit one of the felonies in the statute. Id at
551. Because the facts of William did not involve an innocent person, the defendant
could not be liable under the felony-murder doctrine. Id. The court, however, stated,
in dicta, that the proximate cause theory achieves the most equitable result, while the
agency theory appears unduly to limit the scope of the felony-murder concept. Id.
The dissent went even further, arguing that the defendant should be liable for a codefendant's death under the statute, as long as the death is foreseeable. Id. at 555
(Pierce, CJ.,dissenting). In 1975, the Florida Legislature redefined second degree
felony murder, creating a new offense under which all principals, whether present or
absent, are culpable for any killings which are committeed during the felony by nonparticipants in the felony. Florida v. Dene, 533 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1988). Thus, second
degree felony murder requires that the killing be done by a nonprincipal. Id. at 269.
See also Webster v. State, 540 So. 2d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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Because most of the felony-murder statutes that are in effect today are not clear on the requirement of causation, courts must use the
rules of statutory interpretation to ascertain the meaning of the statute.lg2 Although "any conflict between the legislative will and the judicial will must be resolved in favor of the former,"lg3 statutory
interpretation is not a mechanical application of rules.lg4 Because
much of statutory interpretation is discretionary, the courts' approach
to statutory interpretation is very important.
There are certain principles that underlie the rules of statutory
interpretation. First, the rules help to ensure that the proper distribu'tion of power between the courts and the legislature is maintained.
The courts' power is limited to the interpretation of statutes while the
legislature has the power to create the law.lg5 The rules guide courts
in their interpretation of the statute so that the courts do not overstep
their boundaries.lg6 Secondly, rules of statutory interpretation promote uniformity and consistency in the meaning of statutes. A set of
guidelines helps to prevent the "unbridled discretion of the judiciary."lg7 If courts employ a consistent interpretive approach, the results will be equitable and will promote the uniform administration of
justice.
In interpreting the causation requirement of the felony-murder
doctrine, these principles have frequently been forgotten. Courts
reach conclusions about which theory to use based on faulty analytical
reasoning, often legislating and providing inconsistent results. The
legislative history provides little guidance, and those courts that rely
on it seem to do so only to support a more restrictive view of the felony-murder doctrine. For example, although the court in Alvara relied on legislative history to determine that the agency theory
192. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must apply the plain meaning
of the statute to resolve the question before i t If the plain meaning of the statute is
not apparent, the court must examine the larger context of the statute. The courts
have used various contextual approaches to statutory interpretation. Some courts
have held that unless the statutory language clearly answers the question, the preferred interpretation is that which advances the purposes of the statute. See State v.
Delafose, 441 k 2 d 158, 160 (Conn. 1981). Another view, based on the law and economics movement, is that the interpretation should reproduce the answer that would
have been reached by the legislature that originally enacted the statute. Some courts
look at that original intent, and then interpret the intent as it reflects present conditions and societal views. See generally Gina Limandri, Note, Realism and Reasonableness
in Statutory Construction: People v. Anderson, 40 HAsn~csL.J.805 (1989).
193. DICKERSON,
supra note 89, at 8.
194. Fxankfurter, supra note 151, at 529.
195. Quintin Johnstone, A n Evaluation of the Rules of Statutoly Intqetation, 3 KAN
L. REV. 1 (1954).
196. Id. at 8-9.
197. Id. at 9.
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applies,lg8the court interpreted the legislative history to show that the
new statute meant the same thing as the old statute.lg9 Because the
principal debate during the recodification concerned the aff~rmative
defense, the Alvara court found that there was no history to suggest
that the scope of the doctrine should be expanded.200 Thus, to be
consistent with the rules of statutory interpretation, courts should not
apply the agency theory of causation unless the statute specifically
states that the fatal shot must be fired by one of the felons.201
Similarly, to only require "but-foryycausation is not sufficient.202
In the felony-murder situation there is no mens rea requirement for
the homicide. In the situation where the victim is killed by a nonparticipant in the felony, there is also no intent for the underlying felony.
Therefore, to only require factual causation is inherently unfair and
does not place a sufficient burden on the prose~ution.2~~
The following analysis is both fair to the defendant and consistent with statutory
interpretation.
In the felony-murder situation, the analysis of causation requires
a two-tiered approach. First, when defining the felonious act, the
court must look:
[Nlot only [at] the actual facts of the transaction, and the circumstances surrounding it, but [also at] the matters immediately antecedent to and having a direct causal connection
with it, as well as acts immediately following [sic] it and so
198. Alvarez v. District Court of Denver, 525 P.2d 1131-32 (Colo. 1974).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1133. Another example is found in State v. Gamer, 115 So. 2d 855 (La.
1959). In G a m , the deceased was killed by a shot from a pistol fired by the bartender, who was firing at the defendant in self-defense. Id. at 857. The prosecution
argued that the defendant had set into motion a series of events that led to the victim's death, and that because the defendant should have known that the bartender
would try to defend himself, the defendant should be liable for murder. Id. at 859-60.
The Louisiana statute in effect at the time stated that a person is guilty of murder
when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of various enumerated felonies. Id. at 863. The court looked toward legislative intent and
determined that the word "offendern means actual killer. Id. at 864. Thus, the court
applied the agency theory and concluded that to adhere to the proximate cause theory would be to amend and enlarge the statute's scope. Id.
201. In holding that the correct theory is proximate cause, the court in State v.
Williams, 254 So. 2d 548, 550 (Fla. Dist C t App. 1971), stated that the test is predicated upon the ultimate purpose of the felony-murder statute, which is to prevent the
death of innocent persons likely to occur during the commission of inherently dangerous felonies. The statute is designed to protect the innocent public. Id. at 551.
202. See State v. Martin, 573 k 2 d 1359, 1364 (N.J.1990).
203. The rationale for only requiring "but-forncausation may rest on an attempt to
justify those cases where a defendant could be liable for the death of an innocent
bystander who is killed by a third party, but could not be liable for the death of a cofelon who is killed by a third party. It could be argued that "but-forn causation is
present in the first scenario but not in the second, thus reconciling those two fact
patterns.
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closely connected with it as to form in reality a part of the
Thus, the court must determine, as a first step, whether the conduct
causing the death is conduct that is causally related to the felony.
The statutory language that conveys this connection is "in perpetration of," "in furtherance of," "in the commission of' and "in immediate flight." Although some courts have construed the language "in
perpetration of' to be evidence of the agency theory,205this construction is not accurate. The word "perpetrate" means the act of someone
committing the crime either with his own hands or by some means or
instrument or through some innocent agent.*06 Thus, perpetration
goes toward the act requirement and not toward the causation
requirement.
Similarly, the courts construing the newer statute have found that
the words "in furtherance of," and "in the commission of" are words
that mean that the killing must be done by the felon or c o - f e l ~ n . ~ ~ ~
Again, this is a misleading analysis. Those words go toward the act
requirement and require a finding that the act of killing takes place
within the felonious act. The purpose of those words is to exclude the
situation where a killing occurs after the felony has been completed.
For example, in Doane v. Cornm~nwealth~~~
a defendant ran a stop sign
and killed a person while he was driving a car that he had stolen the
day before. The court held that the larceny could not be used to
make this a felony-murder because the killing occurred outside the
res gestae of the felony.209Compliance with the "in furtherance" language ensures that a defendant's conduct at the time of the killing is
conduct that Mls within the scope of the underlying felony.*1° Thus,
the court must first determine whether the defendant's felony dictated the conduct which led to the homicide. If so, and the time and

204. State v. Fouquette, 221 P.2d 404, 417 (Nev. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 932
(1951).
205. See supra part 111 B.1.
LAWDICTIONARY
1140 (6th ed. 1990).
206. BLACK'S
207. Other courts, however, have found that the "in furtherance" language is legislative intent of proximate cause. See State v. Young, 469 k 2 d 1189 (Conn. 1983);
People v. Lewis, 444 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (N.Y. Sup. C t 1981); see also supra part I11 B.1.
208. 237 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1977).
209. Id. at 798.
210. In making this determination, the courts generally look at whether the homicide and the felony are closely connected in time, place, and continuity of action. See,
e.g., State v. Hearron, 619 P.2d 1157 (Kan. 1980); State v. Adams, 98 S.W.2d 632 (Mo.
1936); State v. Wayne, 289 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1982). Cases from other jurisdictions
diier considerably on what constitutes sufficient time, place, and continuity of action
to find the necessary nexus. Generally, this detennination is a question for the jury.
People v. Gladman, 359 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1976).
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place are not too remote, then the first tier of the analysis is
satisfied.211
Once there is evidence to support that finding, the court must
determine if the requirement of causation has been met. Although
the older statutes do not have any specific language that speaks to
causation, the requirement of causation is inherent in every resultoriented crime.212 The newer statutes contain the language "causes
the death of any personn213which is the same causation language that
is used in all homicides that require a mens rea.214 Thus, the tier of
the causation analysis requires an approach that is similar to the approach used by the courts in other homicide cases.
The court must determine whether the felonious act caused the
victim's death. In making that assessment, the court must use a twoprong analysis: There must be both "but-for" causation and foreseeability. To satisfy "but for" causation, the court must find that the result could not have happened in the absence of the conduct of the
defendant. But-for causation alone, however, is not sufficient. There
must also be legal or proximate causation.215
211. See State v. Harrison, 564 P.2d 1321, 1323 (N.M. 1977), (finding that it is
insufficient to conclude that there is felony-murder whenever the "'homicide is
within the res gestae of the initial crime.' ")(quoting State v. Adams, 98 S.W.2d 632,637
(Mo. 1936)). There must also be the requirement of causation which consists of
those acts of the defendant "initiating and leading to the homicide without an independent force intervening." Id. at 1324.
& Scorr, supra note 44, at 277.
212. MAVE
213. See, e.g., AIA. CODE§ 13A-6-2 (1982); ALASKASTAT.§ 11.41.1 10 (1989); k z .
REV. STAT. ANN. 13-1105(A) (1989); ARK, CODEANN. 5-10-101 (Michie Supp.
§ 53a-54c
1991); COLO.REV. STAT. 18-3-101 (Supp. 1992); CONN.GEN.STAT.ANNANN.
(West 1985); DEL. CODEANN. tit 11, § 636 (Supp. 1992); GA. CODEANN. 16-51(c)
(Michie 1992); ILL.REV. STAT.ch. 9, para. 9-1 (Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit
17-A, 202 (West 1983); N.J. STAT.ANN. 2C:ll-3 (West Sdpp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL
LAW 125.25 (McKinney 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147 (1992); N.D. CENT.CODE
g 12.1-16-01(l) (c) (1985); OR REV. STAT.§ 163.115(l(b) (1991); UTAHCODE.ANN.
§ 76-5203 (Supp. 1992); WASH.REV. CODEANN. 9A.32.030 (West Supp. 1993); W I ~ .
STAT.ANN. 940.03 (West 1992). Other statutes use the word "kills." See, e.6, IND.
CODEANN. § 3542-1-1 (Bums Supp. 1992); IOWACODEANN. § 707.2 (West 1979);
NEB.REV. STAT.§ 200.030 (1991); Wo. STAT. 6-2-101 (Supp. 1992).
214. See sources cited supra note 213.
215. Seesupra notes 128-30. There have been arguments both for an against proximate cause. Those in Eavor of the doctrine argue that it is justified in terms of the
underlying goals of felony-murder. It is not fair to hold a person responsible for
deaths that are not related to the felonious conduct The goal of deterrence is also
not met if the homicide is not a foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct. See
Crump & Crump, supra note 12, at 384. Those against proximate cause argue that it
inappropriately extends the felony-murder rule because the goal of deterrence can
never be achieved by holding felons strictly responsible for killings committed by persons not acting in furtherance of the felony. People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130,133
(Cal. 1965). Some also argue that the tort liability concept of proximate cause can
never be appropriate in the criminal context because of the difference between the
rationales underlying tort and criminal law. State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 30 (N.J.
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In regular homicide cases, the problems of proximate cause arise
when the actual result of the defendant's conduct is different from
the result that the defendant intended.216 In a felony-murder situation, however, a defendant may not have intended the >esultat all. In
fact, in the situation where someone other than one of the defendants
kills an innocent bystander, the defendant may not even be in the
vicinity at the time of the killing.217 The question of proximate cause
then becomes whether because of the nature of the underlying conduct, the death is foreseeable.
Courts have not had difficulty in applying the foreseeability test
in felony-murder cases where the felon caused the victim's death. In
these cases, the courts look at the intervening act and determine
whether it breaks the chain of foreseeability. The intervening act can
be the act of a third person, the victim himself, or a non-human entity. This interveningact can be a coincidence, where the defendant's
conduct puts the victim at a certain place at a certain time. Or, the
intervening act can be a response, where it is a reaction to conditions
that were created by the defendant. Generally, if the intervening act
creates a coincidence. that act will break the causal chain unless it was
foreseeable. If the intervening act is a response to the conditions created by the defendant, the intervening act will only break the causal
chain if it is an abnormal response. The same analysis should apply in
the situation where a nonparticipant in the felony kills a police officer
or innocent bystander.
When a victim dies as a result of a shot that is not fired by one of
the defendants, the death is the result of an intervening act following
the defendants' conduct, which is the committing of the felony. The
intervening act is the act of a third party, the nonparticipant in the
felony.*ls When determining whether the defendant should be liable,
1977). Although courts have held that there should be a closer and more direct
causal connection between the felony and the killing than the causal connection required under the tort concept of proximate cause, no valid test has been suggested.
See id; Commonwealth v. Myers, 261 k 2 d 550,55657 (Pa. 1970); Note, Recent CaesDefendant not Guilty of Felony M u r k for Death of Co-lon Jwtzjiably Shot by PolicemanCommonwealth v. Redline (Pa. 1958), 71 W v . L. REV. 1565 (1958). It would seem
that a requirement of foreseeability as required under that proximate cause test is
better than no test at all. Seesources cited supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text
216. That is assuming that the homicide results from a crime of intention. Otherwise, the homicide must vary from the result that the conduct created a risk of
happening.
217. See People v. Priest, 672 P.2d 539 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding defendant
liable under the felony-murder doctrine, even though he was sixty miles away at the
time of the murder, because he supplied information, tools, his car, and his apartment for planning sessions, therefore knowing that the armed robbery was going to
take place).
218. The intervening act can also be the act of the victim himself, or something
that is nonhuman. In the felony-murder situation, however, the intervening act is
generally the person doing the shooting.
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a court must first examine the intervening act of the third party to see
if it is a coincidence or a response to the defendant's conduct. If the
intervening act is a response to the defendant's conduct, the defendant should be liable unless the response was abnormal. If the intervening act is merely a coincidence, the defendant should be liable as
long as the act should have been foreseeable to the defendant.
Thus, the rules of statutory interpretation do not support the a p
plication of the agency theory to felony-murder cases. Cases that involve a death where the bullet was not fired by one of the felons or
where it is not clear who fired the fatal shot, should be treated in the
same way as cases where the felon fired the fatal shot. After determining whether the conduct that caused the death is within the felonious
act, the court should then apply a two-prong causation analysis. If
there is both factual and legal causation, then the defendant should
be held liable for the death. This analysis results in a more consistent
and uniform approach and reflects society's views toward justice.

VI. AN APPLICATION
OF THE PROPOSED
~ALYSIS
When this analysis is applied a set of facts, a consistent and just
result is reached. Assume, for example, that t'cvo co-felons rob a store
and are pursued by police officers. During the confusion of the chase,
a police officer mistakenly shoots and kills another police officer, believing that he is one of the felons. Assume that the statute does not
specifically state whether the shot must be fired by one of the felons
for liability to attach. The first inquiry is whether the conduct that
caused the death is within the felonious act. Here, the shooting occurred during the flight from the felony, so the conduct clearly falls
within the scope of the underlying felony.
There is also "but-for" causation here. But for the defendants'
initial conduct of robbery, the police officer's death would not have
occurred. The final inquiry is whether there is proximate cause. The
shooting by the police officer is an intervening act that was a response
to the defendants' initial conduct, which ~vasthe robbery. It was not
an abnormal response; in Eact those who commit forcible felonies
know that they may encounter resistance, both to their affirmative actions and to any escape. Thus, the death ~vasforeseeable and the defendants may be criminally liable under the felony-murder doctrine.
However, liability may not always attach. A bank robber would
not be liable under the felony-murder doctrine if at "the moment a
bank robber stepped into the bank, an employee pushing the button
for a burglar alarm was e l e c t r o ~ u t e d . "A~ more
~ ~ limited view of causation might be employed to keep the felony-murder doctrine within
reasonable bounds where the victim dies from excitement as a consequence of watching the gun battle or where an innocent bystander is
219. MODELPENALCODE§ 2.03(4) cmt. at 264 (1985).
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killed by vigilantes who are chasing the felon. In those cases, the
death of the victim would be "too remote, accidental in its occurrence, or too dependent on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the defendant's culpability."220
As these examples illustrate, when a nonparticipant is killed by a
nonparticipant during the course of a felony, the focus should be on
the relationship between the victim's death and the felony, not on the
individual roles of the felons. A defendant should be exculpated only
when a death is so unexpected that it would be unjust to hold the
defendant responsible for the result. An analysis that requires a nexus
between the death and the felony in terms of time and place, as well as
"but-for" causation and foreseeability, accomplishes this purpose.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although there are many different variations of the felony-murder rule, most of them do not directly address the element of causation. Consequently, the courts have relied on different theories of
causation to either restrict or expand liability in felony-murder cases.
These different theories gain even greater significance when they are
applied to the situation where someone other than the defendant kills
a nonparticipant in the underlying felony. Under the agency theory,
some courts have held that the prosecution must prove, as a threshold
matter, that the shot that killed the victim came from the gun of the
defendant or one of his confederates. Under this theory, therefore,
there can never be liability in the situation where an innocent bystander is killed by a police officer in a gun battle.
Although some courts have required only factual causation, and
others have required both factual causation and foreseeability, the analytical framework for these requirements has been inconsistent and
unclear. Although the courts look toward legislative history for direction, there is generally little guidance. The proposed analysis provides
a framework that reflects the canons of statutory interpretation and
allows the consistent administration of justice, even in those cases
where it is not clear who fired the fatal shot.
The felony-murder doctrine, though much maligned, continues
to exist and be used as a theory of liability in forty-seven states. In fact,
as society's fear of crime continues to escalate, the doctrine, even with
all of its shortcomings, will continue to flourish. The courts must,
therefore, treat the doctrine carefully and interpret its provisions cautiously and consistently. The proposed analysis of the causation requirement serves this purpose by reflecting society's view toward
criminal liability and promoting the uniform administration ofjustice.

220. State v. Martin, 573 k 2 d 1359, 1375 (N.J.1990).
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Author's note: Just prior to publication of this Article, the New York
Court of Appeals released its opinion in People v. HernancZez, 624
N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1993). In affirming the defendants' convictions, the
court ended the confusion surrounding the approach that should be
taken by the New York lower courts in determining whether the felony
murder doctrine applies when a nonparticipant in the crime is killed
by another nonparticipant. In its analysis, the unanimous Hernandez
court applied the familiar tenets of statutory construction in interpreting the causation requirement for felony murder. The court held that
"causes the death" should be construed in the same way as the identical language in other homicide statutes. Thus, the court applied the
broad language of proximate causation that is the law in New York.
The Hernandez opinion represents an example of the court following the analysis proposed by this author. The court's use of the
proximate cause theory of causation instead of the agency theory focuses on the relationship between the victim's death and the underlying felony, and not on the particular roles of the felons. The decision
reflects the court's tradition of rigorously adhering to principles of
statutory construction, and accomplishes the goal of the consistent administration of justice.
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ALABAMA
AIA. CODE5 13A-62 (1982)

ALASKA
ALASKASTAT.§ 11.41.110
(1989)
ARIZONA
ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 131105 (A) (1989)
ARKANSAS
ARK. CODEANN. § 5-10-101
(Michie Supp. 1991)
CALIFORNIA
CAL. PENALCODE§ 189
(West 1988)
COLORADO
COLO.REV. STAT. § 18-3-101
(Supp. 1992)
CONNECTICUT
CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN.
§ 53a-54c (West 1985)
DELAWARE
DEL.CODEANN. tit. 11,
5 636 (Supp. 1992)
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FLA.STAT.ANN. 3 782.04
(West 1992)
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No Felony-Murder Statute
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IDMO CODE$ 184003
(Supp. 1993)
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ILL.REV. STAT.ch. 9,para. 91 (Supp. 1993)
INDIANA
IND,CODE.ANN. 3 35-42-1-1
(Burns Supp. 1992)
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IOWACODEANN.$ 707.2
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X

3
X

kills

mitigates

ZYNTEWITY OF DETROlT MERCY LAW REVEW

262

[VoI.71:223

I.

B0

,-I
,-I

m

,,
Ii
,-I

PP

P

2
5;

cz

X

Ya

qs

X

X

X

-2

X

X

X

X

X

X

s

Y

X

X

x

'E'

X

fi o

2I .2.2
O&
22%
0

0

4%

$

fi

g < $Ej

3;

z

P4

a

8

h

o

83

z

U

w

0

s

0 E.M

X

.-E =

z
4

-

8,

,=.ma
.I. o

0

g

E:

E%
I=,
w

E
g

vl

-2

o

o

5 5 2

8-c e,
o o

224
,=

H

03
c

0
'3

Y

3 e,

Y

'E'
SE

X

i0

5 a

3
E
8

3
E
8

Y

S
E

8

" ao
,= .%

8

d'

5
fi 0m o

cD

V1

d

W

m

V1

m
Q,

M

V)

Heinonline - - 71 U. Det. Mercy

262 1993-1994

Statute
NEVADA
NEV.k v . STAT.$ 200.030
(1991)
NEW HAMPSHIRE
N.H. REV. STAT.ANN.
$? 63O:l-b (1986)
NEW JERSEY
NJ. STAT.ANN. $j2C:ll-3
(West Supp. 1992)
NEW MEXICO
N.M. STAT.ANN. $30-2-1(A)
(Michie 1984)
NEW YORK
N.Y. PENALLAW5 125.25
(McKinney 1987)
NORTH CAROLINA
N.C. GEN.STAT.$? 1417
(1992)
NORTH DAKOTA
N.D. CENT. CODE$ 12.1-1601(I) (C) (1985)
OHIO
OHIOREV. CODEANN.
$ 2903.01 (Anderson 1993)
OKLAHOMA
O w . STAT.ANN. tit 21,
$ 701.7 (West 1993)
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OREGON
OR. REV.STAT.5 163.115
(1) (b) (1991)
PENNmLVANIA
PA. STAT.ANN. tit. 18, 2502
(b) (1991)
RHODE ISLAND
R.I. GEN.LAWS 11-23-1
(Supp. 1992)
SOUTH CAROLINA
S.C. CODEANN. 5 16-3-10
(1985)
SOUTH DAKOTA
S.D. CODIFIED
LAWSANN.
5 22-164 (Supp. 1993)
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TEXAS
TEX.PENALCODEANN. 1902(a) (3) (West 1989)
UTAH
UTAHCODEANN. 5 76-5-203
(Supp. 1992)
VERMONT
VT. STAT.ANN. tit. 13,s 2301
(Supp. 1992)

13

commits
commits

Statute
VIRGINIA
VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-32
(Michie Supp. 1993)
WASHINGTON
WASH.REV. CODEANN.
§ 9A.32.030 (West Supp.
1993)
WEST VIRGINIA
W. VA.CODECJ 61-2-1 (1992)
WISCONSIN
WIS. STAT.ANN. 3 940.03
(West 1992)
WYOMING
Wo. STAT.§ 6-2-101
(Supp.1992)
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KEY:
1. Extreme indifference (murder), negligence (manslaughter)
2. Criminal negligence
3. Intentional wanton extreme indifference
4. Malice
5. Intent
6. Unlawfully
7. Knowingly

X

8. Purposely
9. Recklessly
10. Is caused by anyone
11. Penal Code defines causation
12. Reasonably foreseeable consequence
13. An act clearly dangerous to human life
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